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SOVEREIGN PREEMPTION STATE STANDING
Jonathan Remy Nash
ABSTRACT—When does a state have standing to challenge the Executive
Branch’s alleged underenforcement of federal law? The issue took on
importance during the Obama Administration, with “red states” suing the
Executive Branch over numerous issues, including immigration and health
care. The question of state standing has already appeared in important
litigation during the first months of the Trump Administration, only with
the political orientation of the actors reversed.
This Article argues in favor of sovereign preemption state standing,
under which a state would enjoy Article III standing to sue the federal
government when (1) the federal government preempts state law in an area,
yet (2) the Executive Branch allegedly underenforces the federal law that
Congress enacted to address that very same area. Sovereign preemption
state standing arises naturally out of the function of states in the federal
system. It is grounded upon parens patriae injury—that is, injury to the
state’s ability to protect its citizens against harm. The federal government
can properly preempt state law, on the logic that it then assumes from the
state the obligation to protect the state’s citizens from harm. Where the
Executive Branch then fails adequately to enforce federal law, it leaves the
state’s citizens unprotected. The state then has Article III standing to sue
the federal government on behalf of its citizenry.
The universe of cases where sovereign preemption state standing
operates is not large, which should assuage concerns over opening the
floodgates of state–federal litigation. Moreover, prudential doctrines can be
overlaid such that more cases would be screened out. Although sovereign
preemption state standing could conceivably extend to Executive Branch
overenforcement, such an application would not square with the functional
justification for the doctrine.
AUTHOR—Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University
School of Law. For valuable comments on drafts of the paper, I am grateful
to Tara Leigh Grove, Kay Levine, Robert Mikos, Rafael Pardo, and
Shannon Roesler. I also benefited from participation on panels on state
standing at the 2016 southern regional meeting of the National Association
of Attorneys General and at a Public Policy Conference on “Environmental
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Law in the Administrative State” hosted by the Center for the Study of the
Administrative State at the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason
University.
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INTRODUCTION
What standard must a state meet to establish proper standing in federal
court to sue the United States? The traditional test for Article III standing
calls for plaintiffs to establish an “injury in fact.” 1 Most plaintiffs assert an
economic injury in fact. Yet, while states sometimes can rest a lawsuit on a
valid economic injury, 2 often the types of complaints states have—and
hence the injuries they can allege—are not economic. Rather, these injuries
may go to the states’ very sovereignty and ability to protect their citizens.
Such noneconomic injuries are perhaps especially likely to abound where
states assert alleged injuries suffered at the hands of the federal
government.
The Supreme Court has, over time, allowed states greater berth in
suing the federal government. It has recognized the standing of states to sue
for direct constitutional injuries allegedly imposed by action of the federal
1

See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The standard test for standing
includes two other elements as well: causation and redressability. See id. at 560–61; infra notes 39–44
and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 253 (1972) (suit—ultimately
unsuccessful on the merits—under the antitrust laws for damages state suffered in its “proprietary
capacity”).
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government.3 And, while it has never directly so held, its cases can be read
to support the normatively desirable notion that states have standing to
challenge the validity of preemption of their laws by the federal
government.4
Yet, with the tremendous growth of federal administrative agencies,
states may suffer injuries at the hands of the federal government that
neither of these lines of cases cover. Regulatory actions by the Obama
Administration wound up prompting federal lawsuits by collections of socalled “red states,” with the states arguing that the Executive Branch was
not enforcing the laws as Congress had written them. 5 And, as shown by
state challenges to President Trump’s executive orders on immigration, it
appears that “blue states” stand ready to employ a similar strategy against
the Trump Administration. 6
The important question thus arises: Does a state have standing to raise
a claim that the Executive Branch is underenforcing the law as enacted by
Congress? Here, the muddled state of the law provides no clear path to
state standing. Much of this confusion stems from the Supreme Court’s
2007 opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA.7 There, the Court held that the State
of Massachusetts had standing to challenge the U.S. EPA’s refusal—and
assertion of an absence of statutory power—to regulate greenhouse gas
tailpipe emissions. 8 The five-Justice majority concluded that, as sovereigns,
states enjoy “special solicitude” in the standing calculus. 9 Yet the actual
role that sovereignty played in the Court’s conclusion remains murky.
Despite the Court’s recitation of sovereignty as a factor in its analysis, the
Court, in the end, emphasized Massachusetts’s ownership of coastal
property—property that would disappear if the predicted effects of climate

3

See infra Section I.C.3.a.
See Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851,
880–85 (2016) (relying upon, among other cases, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), to conclude that a state has standing to challenge preemption
of its law by the federal government).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (challenge by states to Executive Branch
enforcement of the federal immigration laws); see also infra notes 12–22 and accompanying text
(discussing the case).
6 See Adam Nagourney, Expecting Trouble, California Picks Up Some Legal Muscle, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2017, at A14 (“Girding for four years of potential battles with President-elect Donald J. Trump,
Democratic leaders of the California Legislature announced . . . that they had hired Eric H. Holder Jr.,
who was attorney general under President Obama, to represent them in any legal fights against the new
Republican White House.”); Vivian Yee, To Combat Trump, Democrats Look to G.O.P. Tactic:
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2016, at A1.
7 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
8 Id. at 518–19.
9 Id. at 520.
4
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change came to pass—as the basis for finding that Massachusetts had
standing.10 The actual basis on which the Court rested Massachusetts’s
standing thus seems like a traditional economic, not sovereignty-based,
injury. On this reading, the “special solicitude” that the majority afforded
states goes not to any aspect of state sovereignty as such but rather reduces
the stringency of the ordinary—and still applicable—economic standard
test for injury. 11
The current state of the law thus puts states seeking to sue the United
States in the difficult position of trying either (1) to shoehorn what
probably is not a traditional economic injury into that pigeonhole; (2) to
assert an injury to sovereignty based on precedent that provides only
limited, and murky, support for the validity of such an injury in the
standing inquiry; or (3) both. The law thus remains unclear and
impoverished in terms of the bases on which states have standing to sue in
federal court.
This perplexing post-Massachusetts v. EPA landscape has shaped
efforts by states to challenge the federal government’s approach to
immigration enforcement. Numerous states—including most prominently
the State of Texas12—attempted to establish standing to contest
implementation of a directive issued by the Department of Homeland
Security.13 The directive—Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and
Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) 14—was designed to provide parents
of citizens and lawful permanent U.S. residents legal presence within the
United States.15 Texas claimed it had standing to pursue the challenge to

10

Id. at 522–23.
See id. at 539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
12 Twenty-five other States joined the complaint. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir.
2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). However, insofar as “the presence of
one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement,” Rumsfeld
v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006), the conclusion by the
district court and court of appeals that Texas had standing was a sufficient basis to conclude that federal
court standing was proper over the entire case. For ease of exposition, I refer in the text solely to
Texas’s arguments in favor of standing.
13 See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th
Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
14
See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t Homeland Sec., to León Rodríguez,
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who
Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents 4–5 (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EN7A-W3FT].
15 More precisely, the Department of Homeland Security sought to expand an earlier directive and
implement a new directive. In 2012, the Department implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals program (DACA), under which the Department would exercise its prosecutorial discretion and
11
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DAPA because it would have to issue driver’s licenses to DAPA
beneficiaries. Consistent with the muddled jurisprudence, Texas spun this
basis for standing—and the courts below accepted this basis for standing—
as both economic and sovereignty based. For example, the lower courts
expressly found that the issuance of new driver’s licenses would impose on
Texas a cost of at least “several million dollars.”16 At the same time, the
appeals court found that the need to issue new driver’s licenses also
qualified as an injury to state sovereignty, reasoning that “DAPA affects
the states’ ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests by imposing substantial pressure on
them to change their laws, which provide for issuing driver’s licenses to
some aliens and subsidizing those licenses.”17
While the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the decision below by
tie vote without opinion, 18 the dialogue during oral argument in the case
amply demonstrates similar attempts to cast Texas’s injury as alternatively
economic and sovereignty based. The Texas Solicitor General explained:
“First, we’re raising financial harms from our own State’s fisc. That’s not a
parens patriae. And we’re also raising sovereign harms, and that’s
Massachusetts v. EPA. We have ceded to the Federal government the
authority to determine who’s lawfully present within the borders of the 26
States.” 19
Oral argument also confirmed profound confusion over whether the
Massachusetts v. EPA opinion’s invocation of the states’ entitlement to
“special solicitude” meant that standing was based on economic or
sovereignty-based injury. As noted just above, the Texas Solicitor General
considered Massachusetts to have dealt with states’ sovereignty interests.
In response to a reference by Chief Justice John Roberts to “special
solicitude” in Massachusetts v. EPA, the attorney for the intervenors
(individuals claiming uncertainty as a result of the invalidation of DAPA)
stated: “In that case, it was not a financial claim . . . . [I]t was a claim
related to the State’s quasi-sovereign interest over land.” 20 And Justice

defer immigration enforcement as to certain young people on a case-by-case basis, provided that they
passed background checks. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 146–47. Then, in 2014, the
Department implemented DAPA. DAPA both (1) expanded the pool of people eligible for treatment
under DACA and extended the time period in which enforcement would be deferred, and (2) created the
new DAPA program that would extend treatment similar to DACA to certain parents of U.S. citizens
and lawful permanent residents. See id. at 146–49.
16 Id. at 155 (quoting Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 617).
17 Id. at 153.
18 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
19 Transcript of Oral Argument at 62–63, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15674).
20 Id. at 40.
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Stephen Breyer asserted: “[A]s far as Massachusetts is concerned . . . that
was their own coastline. And that’s not money. That’s the physical territory
belonging to Massachusetts. And, of course, they have standing to protect
that.” 21 These statements are consistent with a sovereignty-based
understanding of Massachusetts. In contrast, the U.S. Solicitor General
seemed to understand Massachusetts as simply expanding the existing basis
for standing, i.e., standing based on economic injury. When Chief Justice
Roberts asked how the injury in the case at bar was “any more indirect and
speculative” than the injury in Massachusetts v. EPA, the U.S. Solicitor
General explained: “States got special solicitude and were allowed to sue in
a manner where, under Article III, they normally wouldn’t be able to sue.”22
The efforts by judges and advocates to fit Texas’s driver’s license
injury into the economic pigeonhole for standing (even as arguably
expanded by Massachusetts’s special solicitude) or into the pure
sovereignty-based pigeonhole is a misguided exercise. But it is the
inexorable result of the Court’s muddled precedent.
In this Article, I advance a blueprint for what I term “sovereign
preemption state standing” to sue the federal government. Sovereign
preemption state standing is, I argue, consistent with the Court’s precedents
and serves to clarify them. It rests upon an injury that is neither economic
nor purely sovereign; rather, it is a form of quasi-sovereign—or “parens
patriae”—injury.23 A state asserts a parens patriae injury on behalf of its
citizenry. Here, that injury arises from a combination of (1) the Executive
Branch underenforcing federal statutory law, and (2) the federal
government actively preempting state law.
More specifically, sovereign preemption state standing arises when, at
a minimum, the following conditions are met. First, the state must allege
that the Executive Branch has underenforced the federal law in a way that
is inconsistent with a governing statute. Second, the state must be able to
point to preemption of state law; in particular, either the preemption of state
law must be obvious and clear from a federal statute or the federal
government must have previously sought, or be concurrently seeking, to
preempt state law. In addition, there must be a nexus between the area of
preemption and the area in which the Executive Branch is allegedly
underenforcing federal law.
Sovereign preemption state standing arises naturally out of the
function of states in the federal system. The Constitution recognizes the
21

Id. at 62.
Id. at 18.
23 “Parens patriae” is Latin for “parent of the country.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico
ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982).
22
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continuing importance of states and preserves much of the states’ police
power authority. 24 The Constitution thus validates the ongoing role of states
in protecting the health and well-being of their citizens.25 A state cannot
fulfill this role when the federal government preempts state law; still, the
state’s citizens receive protection if the federal government puts in place a
federal law to fill the void left by the preemption of state law. Indeed, the
constitutional logic is that the federal government acts in the stead of the
state governments to protect the nation’s citizenry. In effect, the state
government and the federal government both have parens patriae status;
either can validly protect the interest of the people. A state has no
sovereign preemption standing to challenge the mere fact that the federal
government has opted to supersede the state as regulatory parens patriae on
a particular issue. 26
However, this logic breaks down when, notwithstanding Congress’s
decision to put in place a federal law, the Executive Branch underenforces
that law.27 Now, the state can argue that the federal government is not
properly exercising the protective power that the state effectively delegated
to the federal government under the Constitution. And the injury to its
citizenry that results from that underenforcement creates the state’s basis
for sovereign preemption state standing.
Sovereign preemption state standing broadly aligns with prior
precedent governing state standing to sue the federal government. 28
Additionally, it leaves undisturbed the view—recognized by Professors
Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins and by Professor Stephen
Vladeck—that a state should have standing to sue the national government
for a direct injury it has suffered. 29 And it is consistent with the conception
24 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014) (“In our federal system, the
National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.
The States have broad authority to enact legislation for the public good—what we have often called a
‘police power.’”) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)).
25 See id.
26 See infra Section II.C.2 (discussing the possibility of extending sovereign preemption state
standing to settings of Executive Branch overenforcement of federal statutory law).
Furthermore, sovereign preemption state standing can be contracted or expanded by making the nexus
requirement—that is, the degree to which the area of state law preempted by the federal government
aligns with the area of law allegedly underenforced by the Executive Branch—more or less exacting.
See infra Section II.C.1.
27 The Executive Branch might argue that it is not systematically underenforcing the federal
statutory scheme but that it is simply judiciously exercising prosecutorial discretion. Such an argument
might be a valid defense on the merits but would not defeat sovereign preemption state standing based
upon a state’s allegation of underenforcement.
28 See infra Section II.B.
29 See Stephen I. Vladeck, States’ Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 857–65
(2012); Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 209, 217–
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of standing, advanced by Professor Tara Leigh Grove, that allows a state to
challenge the validity of federal government preemption of state law. 30
Sovereign preemption state standing provides the next logical step: It
provides standing where, even if the preemption is valid, the Executive
Branch fails to enforce the federal law that takes the place of preempted
state law. Sovereign preemption state standing thus provides what other
theories do not: a consistent logical lens through which to view the Court’s
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.
My understanding of a sovereign injury sufficient to confer on a state
standing to sue the federal government differs substantially from—
although it is not necessarily entirely incompatible with—the approach
taken by some other scholars on this issue. As noted just above, it is
consistent with Professor Grove’s advocacy of state standing to sue over
the validity of federal government preemption of state law. 31 However, it
conflicts with Professor Grove’s argument that states lack standing to
challenge problems of horizontal separation of powers. 32 Sovereign
preemption state standing also bears no logical relationship to Professor
Shannon Roesler’s argument that a state’s standing to sue the federal
government should turn on whether the state’s suit challenges a federal
program that includes the states in its administration. 33 While theoretically
my approach can coexist with Professor Roesler’s, the analysis below
suggests that the two theories provide standing in largely nonoverlapping
sets of cases.34 In other words, operation of both theories would admit
numerous cases into the federal courts.
The universe of cases where sovereign preemption state standing
operates is not large, which should assuage commentators—like Professors
Woolhandler and Collins and Professor Vladeck—who favor limiting the
bases on which states can sue the federal government. 35 Moreover, courts
could overlay prudential doctrines—that is, subconstitutional standing

18 (2014); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 493–94
(1995).
30 See Grove, supra note 4, at 880–85.
31 See supra text accompanying note 30.
32 See Grove, supra note 4, at 885–99 (arguing that states lack standing to sue over the federal
Executive’s enforcement of federal law because, by virtue of the Executive’s action, the states suffer no
injury different from any other member of society).
33 See Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern
Administrative State, 91 WASH. L. REV. 637, 677–702 (2016).
34 See infra notes 207–09 and accompanying text.
35 See Vladeck, supra note 29, at 874; Woolhandler, supra note 29, at 236; Woolhandler & Collins,
supra note 29, at 490–93.
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doctrines36—on top of sovereign preemption so that more cases would be
screened out.37 Alternatively, courts could also construe sovereign
preemption state standing somewhat more broadly so that it applies not
only to the setting of Executive Branch underenforcement, but to the
setting of horizontal federal disagreement in general—i.e., to the setting of
Executive Branch overenforcement as well.38
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the basics of relevant
standing doctrine, including the standing of states. It highlights the
shortcomings and confusion in the existing law governing state standing to
sue the United States. Part II turns to sovereign preemption state standing.
It first derives the doctrine from the function of states under the
constitutional design. Second, it demonstrates its consistency with existing
precedent. Next, it considers possible nuances in the application of the
doctrine. Last, it explores how sovereign preemption state standing might,
and might not, apply in actual federal court cases (and in one hypothetical
case).
I.

EXISTING STANDING DOCTRINE

This Part explores the jurisprudence governing state standing to sue
the federal government. Section A begins with a brief overview of
traditional standing jurisprudence—that is, the rules governing standing in
a typical case where the plaintiff is not a state and the defendant is not (or
need not be) the federal government or a federal actor. Section B narrows
the focus by looking at the standing of states to invoke the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Section C narrows the focus further still by examining
the Supreme Court’s treatment of standing where a state has tried to sue the
federal government. Finally, Section D surveys the state of the law as other
commentators have tried to crystallize it.
A. Overview of Traditional Standing Jurisprudence
Standing limits the ability of litigants to litigate, and in particular for
plaintiffs to bring lawsuits, in the federal courts. Standing consists of two
components. Its core, “constitutional standing,” emanates from Article III
36 See Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV.
339, 346 (2015). But see Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–
87 (2014) (explaining that some standing requirements to which the Court previously had referred as
“prudential” were better understood as statutory requirements for standing).
37 See infra Section II.C.4 (discussing the application of the bar against “generalized grievances,”
the requirement that Congress have created a statutory cause of action, and the “political question
doctrine” to cases where sovereign preemption state standing otherwise might inhere).
38 See infra text accompanying notes 87–90 (discussing cases where the Supreme Court found that
states lacked standing when they raised “competing parens patriae” claims).
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of the Constitution. In addition, other doctrines—some constitutional and
some subconstitutional (or prudential) 39—further empower federal courts to
decline to recognize the standing of certain plaintiffs to bring lawsuits
against certain defendants in certain circumstances.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the Constitution requires a
plaintiff to make three showings in order establish proper Article III
standing: (1) “injury in fact,” (2) a causal link between that injury and the
conduct complained of, and (3) redressability. 40 The “injury in fact” prong
demands that the plaintiff show that he or she has suffered “an invasion of
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b)
‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’”41 Causation
requires the plaintiff to establish that the injury resulted from the action of
the defendant and not from independent action by a third party. 42 Finally,
the “redressability” prong requires a plaintiff to show that it is “‘likely,’ as
opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a
favorable decision.’” 43 From the plaintiff’s perspective, the “injury in fact”
prong “drives the standing analysis.” 44
B. The Supreme Court and State Standing
In their exhaustive study of state standing, Professors Woolhandler
and Collins highlight the limited number and categories of cases in which
states historically had standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.45 They delineate how, through the nineteenth century, a state had
standing to sue where either (1) the state sought legal help to resolve a state
interest truly sovereign in nature (such as resolving a boundary dispute), or
(2) the state asserted a common law claim. 46 Professors Woolhandler and
Collins conclude that beyond the Republic’s first century, except for state
sovereignty interests, states enjoyed no basis for standing in federal court
beyond what was available to ordinary nonstate litigants.47 In other words,
39

See supra note 36.
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
41 Id. at 560 (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155
(1990)).
42 Id. at 560–61.
43 Id. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)).
44 Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing’s Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1304 (2013); see
supra note 1 and accompanying text.
45 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29.
46 See id. at 406–34.
47 Emphasizing the importance of historical context in interpreting some cases as well as the
frequency of boundary dispute cases in the Court’s original jurisdiction, Professor Shannon Roesler
reads the early cases not to present the same degree of hostility to sovereign-based state standing that
Professors Woolhandler and Collins suggest. See Roesler, supra note 33, at 644–49.
40
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courts were more likely to find standing where an intergovernmental
lawsuit bore resemblance to a traditional suit at common law.
The early years of the twentieth century saw the Court begin to loosen
slightly the barrier against states litigating sovereign interests in federal
court48 such that “the Court no longer necessarily relied on the common law
to decide the merits of intergovernmental disputes.” 49 Highlighted by a
string of state “public nuisance” cases 50 brought before the Supreme Court
in the early twentieth century, 51 the Court opened the door slightly to
allowing states to seek to vindicate their quasi-sovereign—sometimes
called parens patriae—interests.52
Exactly what constitutes a quasi-sovereign interest remains murky.
The clearest exposition of the scope of quasi-sovereignty came in the 1982
case of Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez.53 There,
Puerto Rico (which, the Court stated, was “similarly situated” to a state in
terms of its ability to rely on quasi-sovereign interests to invoke federal
court jurisdiction54) sought to invoke its parens patriae rights on behalf of
its citizens, arguing that apple growers in Virginia had failed to comply
with federal law that required employers to give hiring preference to Puerto
Ricans over temporary foreign workers. 55 The Court took the opportunity to
enumerate the various types of interests on which states might rely to
establish federal court standing. First, “sovereign interests” include (1) “the
exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the
relevant jurisdiction,” which “involves the power to create and enforce a
legal code, both civil and criminal”; and (2) “the demand for recognition
from other sovereigns,” which “most frequently . . . involves the
maintenance and recognition of borders.”56 Second, a state may advance
nonsovereign “proprietary interests” and “private interests.” 57 In this
48

See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 446–64.
Id. at 455.
50
In a public nuisance case, a state seeks to vindicate public interests by enjoining a public
nuisance on the grounds of harms to its citizens’ health, safety, and economic welfare. See id. at 411.
51 See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496
(1906); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
52 See, e.g., Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237 (“This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its
capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the
titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.”).
53 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
54 Id. at 608 n.15 (“[T]he Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is similarly situated to a State in this
respect: It has a claim to represent its quasi-sovereign interests in federal court at least as strong as that
of any State.”).
55 See id. at 594–96.
56 Id. at 601.
57 Id. at 601–02.
49
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capacity, the state sues much as would a typical nonsovereign litigant
(along the lines of Professors Woolhandler and Collins’ historical finding
of ample actions by states based on the common law). 58
The Alfred L. Snapp Court then turned its attention to quasi-sovereign
interests, which “consist of a set of interests that the State has in the wellbeing of its populace.” 59 In order to maintain an action based on a quasisovereign interest, “the State must articulate an interest apart from the
interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a
nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign interest.” 60 The
Court then identified two “general categories” of cases into which
successful quasi-sovereign cases (thus far) had fallen: (1) cases where “a
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both
physical and economic—of its residents in general”; and (2) cases where “a
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its
rightful status within the federal system.” 61 Although the Court did not
consider whether there might be additional categories of quasi-sovereign
interests, it reaffirmed its earlier cases recognizing that states can invoke
the protection of the federal courts on the basis of quasi-sovereign interests.
Thus, by the modern era, the Court had recognized that states had a right to
sue for common law injuries, sovereign interests, and a few categories of
quasi-sovereign interests.
C. The Supreme Court and State Standing to Sue the Federal Government
I turn now to the narrower topic that is the focus of my analysis: the
standing of states to sue the federal government (as opposed to any other
defendant). I address the issue in the context of three time periods—the
nineteenth century, the first half of the twentieth century, and recent years.
I canvas three types of injuries that plaintiff states have asserted—injury to
sovereignty interests, direct injury, and injury to quasi-sovereignty
interests—and the extent to which the Court accepted those injuries as a
58

The Court explained:
Two kinds of nonsovereign interests are to be distinguished. First, like other associations and
private parties, a State is bound to have a variety of proprietary interests. A State may, for
example, own land or participate in a business venture. As a proprietor, it is likely to have the
same interests as other similarly situated proprietors. And like other such proprietors it may at
times need to pursue those interests in court. Second, a State may, for a variety of reasons, attempt
to pursue the interests of a private party, and pursue those interests only for the sake of the real
party in interest. Interests of private parties are obviously not in themselves sovereign interests,
and they do not become such simply by virtue of the State’s aiding in their achievement. In such
situations, the State is no more than a nominal party.
Id. at 601–02.
59 Id. at 602.
60 Id. at 607.
61 Id.
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basis for standing. While the Court initially disfavored suits by states
against the federal government as a general matter and continued to view
injuries to sovereign interests with suspicion, it eventually recognized
standing based on allegation of direct injuries. Its evaluation of injuries to
state quasi-sovereignty interests as a basis for standing to sue the federal
government remains murky.
1. Nineteenth Century
Historically, the Supreme Court disfavored suits by states against the
federal government. Two early original jurisdiction cases arose out of
efforts by Southern states to put a halt to Reconstruction. In the first,
Mississippi v. Johnson, the Court (though it ultimately declined to hear the
case on the merits) seemed open to the idea that “in some cases . . . such a
bill may be filed against the United States.” 62 In the other case—Georgia v.
Stanton63—the Court’s rejection of the State’s standing seemed more
absolute. Citing cases where states had filed suit as plaintiffs (but not
against a federal government actor), and harkening back to the notion that
only actions grounded in common law were generally allowed to move
forward, the Court emphasized that the complaint called “for the judgment
of the court upon political questions, and, upon rights not of persons or
property, but of a political character.”64 In short, whatever the reason, the
Court was reluctant to recognize state standing to sue the federal
government in this era.
2. The Early Twentieth Century
The first part of the twentieth century was a time of transition in
standing law.65 Simplifying the history here for purposes of a concise
narrative, legal initiatives by progressive interest groups and lawyers
sought to establish regulation of economic transactions in order to expand
71 U.S. 475, 501 (1866) (“It is true that a State may file an original bill in this court. And it may
be true, in some cases, that such a bill may be filed against the United States. But we are fully satisfied
that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us.”).
63 73 U.S. 50 (1867).
64 Id. at 77. The Court stated:
That these matters, both as stated in the body of the bill, and, in the prayers for relief, call for the
judgment of the court upon political questions, and, upon rights not of persons or property, but of
a political character, will hardly be denied. For the rights for the protection of which our authority
is invoked, are the rights of sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate
existence as a State, with all its constitutional powers and privileges. No case of private rights or
private property infringed, or in danger of actual or threatened infringement, is presented by the
bill, in a judicial form, for the judgment of the court.
Id.
65 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 469 (“This era for standing therefore was more
transitional than is usually supposed . . . .”).
62
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personal liberties and rights. In turn, this prompted evolution in the law of
federal court standing. 66 Perhaps recognizing the likely growth of lawsuits
advancing personal rights and liberties, the Court sought to cull that growth
by developing more specific, and restrictive, standards for litigant standing:
As lawsuits began to move away from their common law moorings, the
Court responded by starting to develop the modern test for standing. In
many senses, that test seeks to ensure that lawsuits have at least a
substantial resemblance to suits at common law by emphasizing the
importance of economic injury caused by the defendant. 67 Still, the Court
designed its approach to stem, not to stop, the tide of cases alleging
categories of injuries not previously welcomed in the courts.
Like other litigants, states sought to take advantage of the Court’s
growing openness to recognize injuries not typically seen at common law.
One can see in the Supreme Court’s cases three types of injuries advanced
by states: (1) truly sovereign interests (like those advanced by the Southern
states challenging Reconstruction); (2) direct interests (like those advanced
in boundary cases); and (3) quasi-sovereign (or parens patriae) interests.
Indeed, much like (as described in the Introduction) Texas tried to frame its
injury in its recent immigration challenge in multiple ways, the states
sometimes raised more than one type of interest in a case (with varying
degrees of success).68 The following Sections address the Court’s treatment
of each type of interest in turn. 69
66

Beyond the realm of the law of standing, the Court generally clung to the notion that the Due
Process Clause protects economic, but not personal, rights and liberties. See, e.g., James E. Fleming,
Fidelity, Basic Liberties, and the Specter of Lochner, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 149 (1999).
67 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 466–69.
68 See, e.g., id. at 491 n.420 (noting that the Florida v. Mellon Court “attempt[ed] to maintain a line
between direct and indirect injuries”) (citing 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927)). The assertion of various types of
injuries makes it important to keep track of which type of injury the Court is addressing at which point.
For example, while Professor Vladeck correctly notes that Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
258 U.S. 158 (1922), saw a state raise a standing argument “comparable” to the one raised in
Massachusetts v. Mellon, Vladeck, supra note 29, at 852–53, the State based that comparable claim on
its sovereign interest, not the quasi-sovereign argument for which Massachusetts v. Mellon is widely
known. See infra text accompanying notes 71–74.
69 Insofar as states often tried to frame their injuries so as to resemble multiple paradigmatic
interests, a single case sometimes appears in more than one Section. Some commentators have argued
that the restrictions on standing we observe in many of the Supreme Court cases I survey are actually a
feature not of Article III standing but of equitable considerations that attend the invocation of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. See, e.g., Grove, supra note 4, at 868–69 (“[T]he Court’s original
cases do not undermine state standing to assert such interests in federal district court, or on appeal to the
Supreme Court.”); Roesler, supra note 33, at 650, 654; Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 489
(footnote omitted) (“Over time, the Court developed certain principles to exclude cases from its original
jurisdiction, even though that jurisdiction theoretically could be invoked as a matter of right. Some of
these principles prohibit state-as-plaintiff litigation of certain claims altogether, whereas others allow
states to sue in lower courts.”); infra note 82 (noting a statement to this effect by the Supreme Court).
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a. Injury to sovereign interests
The Court treated arguments that a state’s truly sovereign interests—
that is, its ability to enact and enforce its own laws—gave rise to federal
court standing the same way that it had a half century earlier in the
Reconstruction cases: The Court declined to proceed, describing the claims
as nonjusticiable political questions. 70
In the 1922 case of Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission,71 the
State sought to challenge provisions of the Transportation Act of 1920 on
the ground that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting
them. The Court rejected Texas’s assertion of its sovereign interests as the
basis for standing. 72 The argument by the State in the 1923 case of
Massachusetts v. Mellon73—raising a challenge to a federal statute (the
Sheppard–Towner (Maternity) Act of 1921) that tied federal funding to
state spending to reduce infant and maternal mortality—met a similar fate. 74
Likewise, in the 1926 case of New Jersey v. Sargent,75 the Court again
rejected the State’s sovereignty-based standing arguments. Here the State
unsuccessfully argued that Congress had exceeded its constitutional
authority and improperly invaded the province of the State in enacting
The precise distinctions between the boundaries of Article III standing and Supreme Court original
jurisdiction equitable standing nevertheless remain unclear. See, e.g., Woolhandler & Collins, supra
note 29, at 490–91 (“Although the Court first articulated th[e] principle”—that a state cannot assert
parens patriae standing to protect its citizens from the operation of an allegedly unconstitutional federal
statute—“in an original jurisdiction suit, the principle bars state standing in the lower federal courts as
well as in the Supreme Court.”). But the precise distinctions are not integral to my argument. As the text
below shows, even taking the Court’s statements about standing as describing the Article III
boundaries, the Court accepted standing where states relied on quasi-sovereign injuries allegedly caused
by the federal government, see infra Section I.C.2.c, and that position is consistent with the argument I
advance in favor of sovereign preemption state standing. Thus, my exposition simply takes the Court’s
statements about standing at face value.
70 See supra Section I.C.1.
71 258 U.S. 158 (1922).
72 The Court explained:
[T]his part of the bill does not present a case or controversy within the range of the judicial power
as defined by the Constitution. It is only where rights, in themselves appropriate subjects of
judicial cognizance, are being, or about to be, affected prejudicially by the application or
enforcement of a statute that its validity may be called in question by a suitor and determined by
an exertion of the judicial power.
Id. at 162.
73 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
74
The Court stated:
[T]he complaint of the plaintiff State is brought to the naked contention that Congress has usurped
the reserved powers of the several States by the mere enactment of the statute, though nothing has
been done and nothing is to be done without their consent; and it is plain that that question, as it is
thus presented, is political, and not judicial, in character, and therefore is not a matter which
admits of the exercise of the judicial power.
Id. at 483.
75 269 U.S. 328 (1926).
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certain provisions of the Federal Water Power Act and applying them to
waters within and bordering the State.76
In short, the early twentieth century Court remained hostile to state
suits against the federal government based on alleged injuries to the state’s
sovereignty.
b. Direct injury
A direct injury is an injury that sovereigns and nonsovereigns can
suffer alike. In the early twentieth century, the Court confronted settings
where states alleged injury under a specific federal statute or injury
resulting from agency action under some federal statute. The Court
generally applied the same standing requirements that it would have
applied in a case involving a plaintiff without sovereign status. Indeed, one
can see glimpses of elements that would later become part of the modern
tripartite standing test. Moreover, the Court did not uniformly deny the
state’s ability to proceed, although it sometimes directed the state to seek
relief in a lower federal court (or approved standing where the state had
initiated proceedings in the lower federal court).
The Court’s 1920 decision in Missouri v. Holland provides an early
example.77 There, the State of Missouri filed suit in a lower federal court.
Naming a federal game warden as defendant, the State sought to bar
enforcement of a treaty between the U.S. and Great Britain governing
migratory birds, as well as regulations promulgated by the Department of
Agriculture pursuant to the treaty. 78 In upholding the State’s standing, the
Court noted that “[t]he State . . . alleges a pecuniary interest, as owner of
the wild birds within its borders and otherwise, admitted by the
Government to be sufficient . . . .”79
Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission provides another example.
As noted above, Texas advanced an injury to its truly sovereign interests by
virtue of the allegedly unconstitutional enactment of the Transportation Act

76 The Court explained:
The defendants respond with a motion to dismiss, on the grounds, among others, that the bill does
not present a case or controversy appropriate for the exertion of judicial power but only an
abstract question respecting the relative authority of Congress and the State in dealing with such
waters. If this be a proper characterization of the bill the motion to dismiss must prevail, as a
reference to prior decisions will show.
Id. at 330. And, indeed, the Court proceeded to survey earlier authorities—including Georgia v.
Stanton, Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission, and Massachusetts v. Mellon, where the Court had
concluded that the questions raised were not justiciable. See id. at 330–34.
77 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
78 Id. at 430–31.
79 Id. at 431.
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of 1920.80 But Texas also challenged the validity of particular orders of the
Interstate Commerce Commission under that Act. 81 In response to that
claim, the Court found that the State could seek relief but only by joining
interstate carriers affected by the orders and filing “a suit in the District
Court in which the United States is made a party.” 82
In its 1927 decision in Florida v. Mellon,83 the Court confronted
Florida’s challenge to a federal inheritance tax law. Florida alleged “that
the state is directly injured because the imposition of the federal tax, in the
absence of a state tax which may be credited, will cause the withdrawal of
property from the state with the consequent loss to the state of subjects of
taxation.”84 The Court found this allegation insufficient to support the
State’s right to pursue its suit since—using language that would decades
later become a familiar part of the modern test for standing—the notion
that people would withdraw property from the State as a result of the
federal statute was “purely speculative, and, at most, only remote and
indirect.” 85 Thus, the Court’s decision emphasized—in terms common to
current standing analysis—that the case before it did not present a
sufficient injury. However, the Court did not preclude the possibility that a
state could allege a valid direct injury against the federal government.
In sum, the early-twentieth-century Court recognized that states could
establish standing to sue the federal government based on an adequate
direct injury.
c. Injury to quasi-sovereign interests
A state relies on a quasi-sovereign interest when it seeks to vindicate
the well-being of its populace. 86 As we shall see, courts of the era drew a
distinction between cases where states relied on what we might call
“competing parens patriae interests” on the one hand and cases where states
relied on what we might call “true quasi-sovereign interests” on the other.
Competing parens patriae interests are generic interests the state has in
preserving its right to regulate in the face of allegedly illegal lawmaking by
the federal government (or a federal government actor). The state simply

80

See supra text accompanying notes 71–72.
See Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n & R.R. Labor Bd., 258 U.S. 158, 163–64 (1922).
82 Id. at 164; see North Dakota ex rel. Lemke v. Chicago, 257 U.S. 485, 491 (1922) (“There is no
doubt that a State can sue in the District Court when the United States is a party and has consented to be
sued there and has not expressed its consent to be sued elsewhere.”).
83 273 U.S. 12 (1927).
84 Id. at 16.
85 Id. at 18.
86 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982) (“Quasisovereign interests . . . consist of a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace.”).
81
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asserts that its claim to legislate in its parens patriae capacity trumps the
federal government’s competing parens patriae claim. The Court routinely
rejected standing based on such allegations.
In contrast, true quasi-sovereign interests are interests the state has in
retaining jurisdiction to exercise its police power—perhaps especially,
during this time period, over natural resources—within its borders in the
face of federal government attempts to divest it of that jurisdiction. Thus,
true quasi-sovereign interests differ from competing parens patriae interests
in that a state asserting the former argues that the federal government has
wrongly divested it of specific police power authority, leaving it unable to
act within its borders to protect its citizenry. The Court in this era
recognized standing based on allegations of infringement of a state’s true
quasi-sovereign interests.
Consider first cases of competing parens patriae interests.
Massachusetts v. Mellon (discussed above in the context of the sovereign
injury raised in the case) today represents the keystone in the line of
precedent disapproving of injury to quasi-sovereign interests as a basis for
state standing to sue the federal government. 87 The Court in Massachusetts
v. Mellon rejected the State’s assertion that it had parens patriae standing to
challenge the federal Sheppard–Towner Act’s requirement that federal
funding match state expenditures:
We . . . consider whether the suit may be maintained by the State as the
representative of its citizens. To this the answer is not doubtful. We need not
go so far as to say that a State may never intervene by suit to protect its
citizens against any form of enforcement of unconstitutional acts of Congress;
but we are clear that the right to do so does not arise here. Ordinarily, at least,
the only way in which a State may afford protection to its citizens in such
cases is through the enforcement of its own criminal statutes, where that is
appropriate, or by opening its courts to the injured persons for the
maintenance of civil suits or actions. But the citizens of Massachusetts are
also citizens of the United States. It cannot be conceded that a State, as parens
patriae, may institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United
States from the operation of the statutes thereof. While the State, under some
circumstances, may sue in that capacity for the protection of its citizens, it is
no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations
with the Federal Government. In that field it is the United States, and not the
State, which represents them as parens patriae, when such representation

87 See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 29, at 851 (“The fountainhead case in this field is the Supreme
Court’s . . . decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon.”).
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becomes appropriate; and to the former, and not to the latter, they must look
for such protective measures as flow from that status.88

Because the United States had a legitimate parens patriae interest, and
such an interest displaces a state’s parens patriae interest, Massachusetts
had no injury and, therefore, no standing to sue.
In Florida v. Mellon (discussed above in the context of the direct
injury raised by the State), the State argued that, by virtue of the
introduction of the federal inheritance tax, “the citizens of the state are
injured in such a way that the state may sue in their behalf as parens
patriae.”89 The Court summarily dismissed this injury as a basis for suit,
relying heavily on its earlier opinion in Massachusetts v. Mellon.90
Contrast these cases raising “competing parens patriae” injuries,
where the Court proved unwilling to find state standing, with cases raising
“true quasi-sovereign” injuries, where the Court did recognize standing. In
Missouri v. Holland (discussed above in the context of the direct injury
raised), the State filed a claim challenging enforcement of the migratory
bird treaty with Great Britain, as well as of a statute passed to give effect to
the treaty and of Department of Agriculture regulations promulgated
pursuant to the treaty. 91 Missouri argued the federal actions would “invade
the sovereign right of the State and contravene its will manifested in
statutes.” 92 Or, as the State put it, federal law “[invades] the sovereign right
and power . . . to control and regulate the taking, killing and use of wild
game within its borders.” 93 After noting the government’s concession that
the State’s direct injury (by virtue of its proprietary interest in wild birds
within its borders) gave rise to standing, 94 the Court stated: “[I]t is enough
that the bill is a reasonable and proper means to assert the alleged quasi
sovereign rights of a State.”95 While the Court’s opinion in this regard is
not a model of clarity, it seems that the Court rested its conclusion on the
State’s quasi-sovereign rights in the natural resource of migratory birds
88

262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923) (citation omitted).
273 U.S. at 16.
90 The entirety of the Court’s reasoning is as follows: Nor can the suit be maintained by the state
because of any injury to its citizens. They are also citizens of the United States and subject to its laws.
In respect of their relations with the federal government, “it is the United States, and not the State,
which represents them as parens patriae, when such representation becomes appropriate; and to the
former, and not to the latter, they must look for such protective measures as flow from that status.” Id.
at 18 (quoting Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486).
91 252 U.S. 416, 431–32 (1920).
92 Id. at 431.
93 Motion to Advance at 3, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (No. 609).
94 Missouri, 252 U.S. at 431; see also supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
95 Missouri, 252 U.S. at 431.
89
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within its borders, 96 a point bolstered by the Court’s citation of several
earlier cases affirming state standing to assert rights in regulating natural
resources.97
In a 1925 case, Colorado v. Toll,98 the State also asserted a true quasisovereign interest. The case emerged in the wake of the creation of the
Rocky Mountain National Park. The park included areas currently
inhabited99 and had “roads . . . built by counties and the State . . . before the
park was laid out.”100 Colorado alleged that it never had ceded sovereignty
over the park. 101 The dispute in Toll arose when the defendant—the park
superintendent—asserted the authority (allegedly in violation of the
governing federal statute) to ban anyone from residing permanently in the
park and to preclude any for-hire automobiles on the roads within the park
except those to which he had granted licenses. 102 The Court explained that
“[t]he object of the bill is to restrain an individual from doing acts that it is
alleged that he has no authority to do and that derogate from the quasisovereign authority of the State.” 103 Citing Missouri v. Holland, the Court
upheld jurisdiction, reversing the contrary judgment of the district court. 104
While once again the Court did not elucidate the nature of the quasisovereign rights in question as clearly as it could have, it seems fairly clear

96 Professor Grove argues that Justice Holmes’s reference in Missouri v. Holland to “quasi
sovereign rights” pertained more to preemption of state law than to the State’s right to protect and
regulate its natural resources:
Today, jurists and scholars often associate [quasi sovereign rights] with parens patriae standing,
the authority of a State to bring suit on behalf of private citizens, largely because that is how the
Supreme Court used the term in [Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez,
458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982)]. But Justice Holmes was using the term “quasi-sovereign” in a very
different sense—to refer to the State’s sovereign interest in the continued enforceability of state
law.
Grove, supra note 4, at 865 (citations omitted). But this argument ignores both the fact that the subject
of regulation here was clearly a natural resource and that Justice Holmes’s opinion immediately after
referring to “quasi sovereign rights” cited to other cases where a state had sought to vindicate its right to
preserve and regulate its natural resources. See infra note 97; see also Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447, at 482 (1923) (describing the Court as having found standing in Missouri v. Holland
“because, as asserted, there was an invasion, by acts done and threatened, of the quasi sovereign right of
the state to regulate the taking of wild game within its borders”).
97 252 U.S. at 431 (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 142 (1902); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Marshall Dental Mfg. Co. v. Iowa, 226 U.S. 460, 462 (1913)).
98 268 U.S. 228 (1925).
99 See id. at 229 (“There are many thousands of acres in the park owned by private persons, and
there are houses and hotels that were built before the park was laid out.”).
100 Id. at 230.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 229.
103 Id. at 230.
104 Id.
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that the State complained of losing the power to regulate territory within its
borders as to which it had never ceded sovereignty.
Thus, in the early twentieth century, the Court recognized two bases
for state standing to sue the federal government: direct injuries and an
emerging concept of quasi-sovereign rights.
3. The Modern Era
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has developed and refined the
generally applicable test for standing with which we are familiar today. But
on a few occasions, the Court focused on, and recognized, the standing of
states to challenge the action of the federal government. Most of these
cases involve direct injuries to the states. However, the basis for the
Court’s conclusion that standing existed in one case (perhaps the leading
modern case)—Massachusetts v. EPA 105—is less than clear. I canvass the
direct-injury cases and then turn to the Court’s garbled holding in
Massachusetts v. EPA.
a. Direct-injury cases
In a series of cases, the Court has recognized the standing of states
based on constitutional injuries actually suffered by the states. While one
might seek alternatively to categorize these injuries as sovereign in nature
because the Constitution vests the underlying rights in the states as
sovereigns, these injuries are better understood, as I discuss below, as
direct injuries since the rights allegedly infringed belong to the states
themselves.106
In 1966, the Court decided South Carolina v. Katzenbach, upholding
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 against challenges by several
States.107 The ground for the States’ challenges—that the provisions of the
Act “exceed[ed] the powers of Congress and encroach[ed] on an area
reserved to the States by the Constitution” 108—sounds like one the Court
would have dismissed as a nonjusticiable sovereign injury under the
reasoning of Georgia v. Stanton and its progeny.109 But the Court proceeded
to consider on the merits the States’ argument that Congress could not set
voter qualifications in state and federal elections under the Fifteenth
Amendment. While the Court did not make clear the basis for the States’

105
106
107
108
109

549 U.S. 497 (2007).
See infra text accompanying notes 126–28.
383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
Id. at 323.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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standing,110 commentators believe the States had standing to advance this
claim because “the state sought to litigate its own liberty interest in setting
voter qualifications, as provided by specific provisions of the Constitution
that expressly contemplate state power to set such qualifications.” 111
Bolstering this conclusion is the fact that the Court did conclude that the
States lacked standing in respect of other claims they tried to advance. 112
Four years later, in Oregon v. Mitchell, the Court considered the
merits of arguments by four States against federal legislation requiring
them to implement the eighteen-year-old voting age.113 The Court noted
that “[n]o question has been raised concerning the standing of the parties or
the jurisdiction of this Court,” and raised no question of its own. 114 As in
Katzenbach, “[t]he Court again based the state’s standing on explicit
constitutional language contemplating general state control of election
qualifications.” 115
South Carolina v. Regan, decided in 1984, involved a challenge by the
State to a change to the federal tax law that retained the exemption from
federal income taxation for interest earned on state-issued bonds, but only
for certain types of bonds. 116 The State argued that the tax law change
violated the State’s rights under the Tenth Amendment. 117 The Court
accepted without discussion the standing of the plaintiff State. However,
the Court’s reasoning, in the course of rejecting the applicability of the Tax
Anti-Injunction Act (TAIA) 118 to bar the State’s suit, confirms the fact that
110 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (“[A] State [does not] have standing as the parent of its
citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against the Federal Government, the ultimate parens
patriae of every American citizen. The objections to the Act which are raised under these provisions
may therefore be considered only as additional aspects of the basic question presented by the case: Has
Congress exercised its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment in an appropriate manner with relation
to the States?” (citations omitted)).
111 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 492.
112 The Katzenbach Court explained:
The word “person” in the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot . . .
be expanded to encompass the States of the Union, and to our knowledge this has never been done
by any court. Likewise, courts have consistently regarded the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article I
and the principle of separation of powers only as protections for individual persons and private
groups, those who are peculiarly vulnerable to non-judicial determinations of guilt. Nor does a
State have standing as the parent of its citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against
the Federal Government, the ultimate parens patriae of every American citizen.
383 U.S. at 323–24 (citations omitted). For further discussion, see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note
29, at 492–93.
113 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970).
114 Id. at 117 n.1.
115 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 493.
116 465 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1984).
117 Id. at 370.
118 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
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the Constitution assigned the right at issue directly to the State. The federal
government argued that, while the Court had interpreted the TAIA to be
inapplicable where the would-be plaintiff had no alternative remedy, here
the State did have an alternative remedy: It could rely on a lawsuit by a
bondholder to challenge the change to the federal tax law. 119 In rejecting
this argument, the Court noted that “instances in which a third party may
raise the constitutional rights of another are the exception rather than the
rule.” 120 This statement affirms that the constitutional rights at issue in the
case belonged uniquely to the State.
In two more cases after Regan (both of which commenced in federal
district court121), the Court recognized state standing without addressing the
issue. But in both cases, the constitutional rights advanced by the plaintiff
States clearly belonged uniquely to the States. In South Dakota v. Dole, the
Court upheld a federal provision that hinged state receipt of federal
highway funds on the State’s agreement to set the minimum drinking age at
twenty-one.122 South Dakota argued that the federal statute infringed rights
accorded directly to it (the State) under the Twenty-First Amendment.123
And, in New York v. United States,124 New York raised a challenge—resting
on its rights under the Tenth Amendment and the Constitution’s Guarantee
Clause125—to a federal law that required the State either to take title to
radioactive waste or to regulate it on Congress’s terms. Again, in both
cases it was clear that the rights the plaintiff States asserted belonged
uniquely to the States themselves.
While one might justifiably say that the States in these cases are
raising sovereign injuries (in that the Constitution vests all the rights in
question in state sovereigns) or quasi-sovereign injuries (in that the states

119

Regan, 465 U.S. at 380.
Id.
121 See supra note 69 (discussing the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over suits brought by
plaintiff states).
122 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987).
123 Id. at 205. Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution provides: “The
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XXI, § 2. The State pointed to Supreme Court precedent holding that “the ‘Twenty-first
Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of
liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.’” Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987) (quoting
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)).
124 505 U.S. 144, 149–54 (1992).
125 The Constitution’s Guarantee Clause provides: “The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion;
and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
120
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are really raising their arguments on behalf of their citizenry), 126 it seems
far more apt to say that the States here are raising direct injuries. 127 While
direct-injury cases in the nineteenth century extended typically to property
and contract rights, in the cases just discussed, the State is suing to protect
its own (now constitutional) rights, just as a private actor might sue to
protect his or her own rights. 128
b. A Case that Defies Classification: Massachusetts v. EPA
In the most recent case where the Court addressed, and upheld, state
standing, the Court’s language leaves unclear the precise nature of the state
injury that justified standing. In Massachusetts v. EPA,129 the Court
reviewed the denial by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency of a
petition requesting that the agency regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles.130 Although numerous parties aligned against the EPA,131
the Court rested its analysis of standing on the injury to the State of
Massachusetts.132
While the Court’s opinion clearly concludes that Massachusetts had
standing, the majority opinion does not clearly identify the precise nature
of the relevant injury. Instead the Court seems to vacillate between
characterizing the State’s injury as quasi-sovereign and as direct. On the
one hand, the Court recited the traditional test for standing 133 and ultimately
identified the injury as Massachusetts’s loss of coastline on its sovereign
lands,134 a “garden-variety harm that would typically satisfy standing
requirements.”135 In addition, the Court explained how the EPA did not
126 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 S UP. CT. REV. 79, 86–90 (criticizing
the Court’s holding on standing in Katzenbach as inconsistent with its holding in Massachusetts v.
Mellon); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363,
1382 (1973) (“Since no pretense can be made that these cases involve ‘private’ rights, Professor Bickel
is clearly correct in concluding that they stand in open contradiction to the Reconstruction cases and
Massachusetts v. Mellon.”).
127 See Vladeck, supra note 29, at 857–65; Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 492–94.
128
See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 493. It is on this basis that Professor Vladeck
argues that, while Professor Bickel correctly urged the retention of Massachusetts v. Mellon as good
law on the ground that “preemption of a state’s law by the contested federal law cannot of itself provide
the basis for state standing against the federal government,” the very same “thesis would suggest that,
Bickel’s objections notwithstanding, the Supreme Court’s decision in [Katzenbach] was also correct.”
Vladeck, supra note 29, at 849.
129 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
130 See id. at 510–16.
131 The original petition was filed by nineteen private organizations. Id. at 510 & n.15.
132 Id. at 518. The Court reasoned that “[o]nly one of the petitioners needs to have standing to
permit us to consider the petition for review.” Id.
133 See id. at 517–18.
134 Id. at 519.
135 Nash, supra note 44, at 1294.

224

112:201 (2017)

Sovereign Preemption State Standing

contest the harm caused by greenhouse gas emissions, thus allowing the
Court to depict the harm as not merely conjectural 136—again, a logical
maneuver one might expect in a typical standing analysis.
On the other hand, immediately after reciting the traditional test for
standing, the Court asserted that “[i]t is of considerable relevance that the
party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not . . . a private
individual.”137 The Court then invoked its opinion in Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co.,138 one of the quasi-sovereignty cases from the early twentieth
century. There, the Court upheld Georgia’s standing—to sue a private
actor, not the federal government—based on an assertion of Georgia’s
quasi-sovereign interests in order to vindicate the health of its citizenry in
the face of heavy pollution from beyond its borders. 139 The Court then
launched into a description of how Massachusetts’s inability to protect its
citizens against climate change—by virtue of having “surrender[ed]
sovereign prerogatives” to the federal government—gave rise to an injury
where the federal government, though directed to address the problem,
refused to act:
When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives.
Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and
in some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state
motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted.
These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal Government,
and Congress has ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts (among others) by
prescribing standards applicable to the “emission of any air pollutant from any
class or classes of new motor vehicle engines, which in [the Administrator’s]
judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Congress has moreover
recognized a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its
rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious. Given that procedural right
and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.140

Reconciling the Court’s divergent descriptions of the State’s injury
presents no small challenge. While the Massachusetts Court said states are
due “special solicitude” in the standing calculus, one is left to wonder what

136

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521.
Id. at 518.
138 Id. at 518–19 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
139 See Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237.
140 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012)).
137
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role that solicitude plays if the crucial injury is the State’s loss of land.
After all, loss of property is a typical economic injury, and the Court went
to great lengths to establish that the parties agreed on the likelihood of the
injury.141 Indeed, the Court asserted:
[I]t is clear that petitioners’ submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have
satisfied the most demanding standards of the adversarial process. EPA’s
steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm
to Massachusetts that is both “actual” and “imminent.” There is, moreover, a
“substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested” will prompt EPA to
take steps to reduce that risk.142

To be sure, the Court qualified the just-quoted statement by noting
that it was saying this “with [special solicitude] in mind,” but it is hard to
see how special solicitude pushed the case for standing over the edge if the
submissions actually “satisfied the most demanding standards.” 143 On the
other hand, to the extent that the real injury was “Massachusetts’ stake in
protecting its quasi-sovereign interests,” 144 the Court’s emphasis on the loss
of coastline is quite inapposite. 145
In sum, while Massachusetts clearly held that the State had standing,
the Court’s basis for that conclusion remains muddled. Both the nature of
141 See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 S UP. CT. REV. 51, 67 (noting that the case featured “an ordinary standing analysis that focused on
Massachusetts qua large landowner rather than qua sovereign, which found that Massachusetts’s own
coastal property was threatened by rising sea levels traceable to the effects of greenhouse gases,” and
that that analysis was “distinct from the ‘special solicitude’ holding”); see also Bradford Mank, Should
States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing
Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1755 (2008) (“[W]ithout the relaxed immediacy and
redressability standards of footnote seven or the special solicitude that the majority gave to states, the
issue of whether Massachusetts met normal standing requirements is debatable.”).
142 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992);
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978)).
143 Id. at 520–21; see also Mank, supra note 141, at 1707 (“The Court did not clearly explain
whether Massachusetts could have met normal standing criteria or needed to rely on the special
standing criteria for states.”).
144 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520.
145 The closest the Court came to drawing the two points together came when it stated:
Just as Georgia’s independent interest “in all the earth and air within its domain” supported
federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its
sovereign territory today. That Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the “territory
alleged to be affected” only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this case is
sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power.
Id. at 519 (citation omitted) (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)). There
are problems with this reasoning: First, the Court’s parallel between the State’s “earth and air within its
domain” and the State’s “sovereign territory” elides the historic distinction between quasi-sovereign
and direct injuries. Second, to the extent that parens patriae is the key to the State’s ability to rely on
land as the basis for standing, it is unclear how ownership of “a great deal” of that land “reinforces” the
“concrete[ness]” of the injury.
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the injury146 and the role of special solicitude 147 have continued to befuddle
commentators.
D. Commentators’ Divergent Assessments
The Court’s splintered jurisprudence has led commentators to come
up with various different descriptive, and normative, assessments of when a
state can, and should, have standing to sue the federal government. Writing
over two decades ago (and before Massachusetts v. EPA), Professors
Woolhandler and Collins acknowledged the emergence of cases in which
the Court allowed states to sue federal government actors but remained
wary of the practice. They explained that the “prohibition against state suits
seeking to vindicate a claim to govern to the exclusion of other
sovereigns . . . reinforced federalism interests as well as strengthened
individual rights and the separation of powers.” 148 And, in recent writing,
Professor Woolhandler remains committed to this view.149 That said, she
effectively concedes that the issue is not one of Article III standing, urging
instead that “courts should decline to use their discretion to recognize such
actions.”150

146

See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249,
264–65 (2009) (“[T]he Court stated that Massachusetts was asserting ‘its rights under federal law,’ a
locution that suggests that Massachusetts’ interest was either a proprietary interest or a sovereign
interest.”) (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17)); Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State Standing in
Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 273, 315–17 (2007) (critiquing the
Court’s treatment of injury in Massachusetts v. EPA).
147 See, e.g., Mank, supra note 141, at 1746 (“A major weakness in the Court’s opinion is that it
never explained to what extent it had relaxed standing requirements for states. It provided little or no
guidance to lower courts about the degree to which they should give ‘special solicitude’ to states in
deciding standing issues.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 67 (2011) (arguing that the “special solicitude” language “indicates the states should be
accorded special access to federal court in order to challenge federal agency action”); see also Freeman
& Vermeule, supra note 141, at 67–68 (asserting that “[i]t seems obvious” that Justice Stevens included
the “special solicitude” language—as well as the language about procedural rights—“at least in
part . . . [t]o garner [the] crucial fifth vote [of] Justice Kennedy”).
148 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 438–39.
149 See Woolhandler, supra note 29, at 236.
Existing remedies accommodate modern federalism; the judicial system traditionally sees private
parties as having the paramount interest in contesting alleged governmental illegality; and the
regulatory purposes of causes of action are served by traditional actions between government and
individuals. In seeking recognition of sovereignty-based actions, moreover, the governmentplaintiff effectively asks the courts to extend the boundaries of both judicial and executive power,
while undermining the role of individuals in challenging government illegality.
Id.
150 Id.
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Professor Vladeck seems more accepting of what I have termed the
modern Court’s direct-injury state standing cases. 151 At the same time, he,
like Professors Woolhandler and Collins, is dubious about further
extensions of state standing to sue the federal government.152
Other commentators take a more expansive view of state standing to
sue the federal government. Focusing on the holding in (if not the
reasoning of) the Massachusetts case, they center on horizontal separation
of powers as a basis for state standing to sue the federal government.
Professor Gillian Metzger argues that, “given that Congress has disabled
them from asserting regulatory authority in their own right, the states have
a sovereign interest”—and therefore a basis for standing—“in ensuring that
the federal government performs its regulatory responsibilities so that
regulatory gaps are avoided.” 153 Professor Bradford Mank asserts that a
state “should be able to file parens patriae suits on behalf of its citizens
against the federal government if the federal government has allegedly
failed to perform a statutory or constitutional duty.”154 Professor Calvin
Massey argues in favor of a broad conception of state standing to assert
parens patriae claims against the federal government based upon Executive
Branch violations of constitutional and federal statutory law. 155 And
Professor Amy Wildermuth can be understood to have argued that
Massachusetts suggests that states may have standing to challenge the
manner in which the federal government implements federal law, where
that implementation results in the preemption of state law.156
151

See supra note 29 and accompanying text. I note that Professor Grove suggests that the States in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach and Oregon v. Mitchell were really arguing that the federal government
had improperly preempted state law governing voter qualifications. See Grove, supra note 4, at 871–72.
152 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
153 Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 D UKE L.J. 2023, 2038
(2008); see also id. at 2037–39. Professor Metzger acknowledges both that such reasoning is not
ultimately consistent with the majority opinion in Massachusetts, see id. at 2038–39, and that it is in
any event subject to numerous objections, see id. at 2039.
154 Mank, supra note 141, at 1771.
155 See Massey, supra note 146, at 276 (asserting that the argument against state standing to sue the
federal government “ignores the fact that states . . . are appropriate custodians of public rights, and state
assertion of public rights in federal court does no more than ensure that executive discretion is confined
within the boundaries of the Constitution and federal law”); id. at 284 (“EPA is a salutary breach of the
hitherto impenetrable Maginot Line of standing that prevented judicial consideration of executive
lawlessness which inflicts universal but impersonal harm on the citizens of our nation.”).
156 Professor Grove characterizes Professor Wildermuth as having “argu[ed] that States may
challenge not only federal preemption but also the manner in which a federal agency implements
federal law.” Grove, supra note 4, at 887 n.181 (citing Wildermuth, supra note 146, at 318–21). I am
not so sanguine that this accurately captures Professor Wildermuth’s argument. Professor Wildermuth
argues that, had the Court in Massachusetts focused on the state of California instead of the state of
Massachusetts, it would have easily found standing based on actual preemption of California law—i.e.,
a violation of its sovereign rights. Professor Wildermuth bases this conclusion on the fact that the Clean
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Professor Tara Leigh Grove takes the view that preemption of state
law alone provides a sufficient basis for state standing to sue the federal
government.157 She also rejects the notion that horizontal separation of
powers has a role to play in the state standing calculus.158
Professor Shannon Roesler melds preemption of state law with the
standing of states to challenge federal administrative programs. Professor
Roesler argues that, “[b]ecause states cannot govern in many areas without
confronting federal administrative law, they should be able to challenge
federal laws and actions that are part of administrative regimes that
contemplate an implementation role for the states.” 159 With this background
principle as the driver, she proposes that, “when states seek to challenge
federal laws and actions, they have Article III standing if the federal law at
issue contemplates a role for state governments in its implementation.” 160
Against this backdrop, I develop my description of sovereign
preemption state standing to sue the federal government. I return to the
Air Act assures California of the opportunity (with a waiver from the EPA) to promulgate its own
standards for motor vehicle emissions standards (with other states free to elect between California’s
standards and those promulgated by the EPA). Professor Wildermuth argues that, insofar as EPA
declined to give California a waiver for standards for greenhouse gas emissions and that the EPA based
this refusal to grant the waiver on the same reasoning it advanced in the Massachusetts case (i.e., that
the EPA lacked the authority to regulate greenhouse gases at all), see Wildermuth, supra note 146 at
318–19, the relief requested in Massachusetts (i.e., a declaration that the EPA indeed had the statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gases) would perforce determine the preemption of state law. Had the
relief not been granted, then (since the EPA would lack power to regulate greenhouse gas emissions),
no waiver would have been needed and state law would not have been preempted. On the other hand,
had relief been granted, then the EPA would have had the power to deny the waiver and thus preempt
state regulatory authority. See Wildermuth, supra note 146, at 318–20. Thus, the injury to California
was, Professor Wildermuth argued, purely “a sovereign one.” Id. at 320. Seen in this light, Professor
Wildermuth did not argue that federal implementation of federal law provides a basis for standing (or at
least not generally, but only in the particular circumstances of the Clean Air Act under the facts of the
Massachusetts case). But cf. Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking
New Ground on Issues Other than Global Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2008) (“We . . .
think that when a state sues the federal government because federal law or administrative action
regulates the state administrative machinery directly or otherwise undermines the state’s independence
in the federal system—such as, for example, by potentially preempting state law—the state may bring
suit without reference to the [traditional standing] analysis.”).
157 See Grove, supra note 4, at 880–85.
158 See id. at 885–99.
159 Roesler, supra note 33, at 677.
160 Id. at 678. Professor Roesler further elucidates:
Federal funding conditioned on state assistance in implementing federal law is enough, as is
conditional preemption of state authority in a given area. The implementation role need not be
substantial, although states will not likely challenge laws that have small impacts (e.g., a law that
requires very little regulatory change at the state level). The federal law must do more than grant
states civil and criminal enforcement authority . . . it must contemplate that states will share in the
day-to-day business of regulating by implementing federal policy through state administrative
mechanisms and institutions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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views of other commentators—in the context of a discussion of the
consistency of their views with sovereign preemption state standing—
below in Section II.B.
II. DESCRIBING SOVEREIGN PREEMPTION STATE STANDING TO SUE THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
This Part introduces the concept of a state’s sovereign preemption
standing to sue the federal government. Section A develops sovereign
preemption state standing as a functional approach to state standing and
describes its essential elements. Section B explains how the concept is
broadly consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent. Finally, Section
C turns to nuances and ways that sovereign preemption state standing
might be broadly or narrowly construed.
A. The Function of States and Sovereign Preemption State Standing
Undoubtedly separation of powers concerns arise when a state sues
the federal government. The Court’s penchant—when faced with
competing parens patriae injuries—to reject jurisdiction on the ground that
the conflict presents a political and not a judicial question, supports this
assertion.161 A functional approach takes account of this concern by limiting
standing to settings where a state seeks to vindicate a constitutionally
preserved function. 162
1. The Constitutional Role of States
The critical question in the separation of powers analysis becomes
what constitutes a state’s function under the Constitution. There are some
relatively easy cases; as I above (and other commentators) have argued, in
cases where the Constitution affords a state a direct injury, the courts can
readily apply the traditional tripartite test for standing—including the usual
understanding of what an injury in fact requires—to determine whether
standing for the state is appropriate. In such a case, the courts need not
depart from the traditional approach to standing, even though a sovereign
state happens to occupy the role of plaintiff.

161

See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (describing Massachusetts v. Mellon, where the
Court rejected the State’s argument that its interest in regulating as a parens patriae should trump the
federal government’s analogous interest).
162 I have elsewhere propounded and defended a “functional” approach to defining the relevant
injury other government entities—the Houses of Congress—can claim as a basis for standing. See Nash,
supra note 36, at 368. There, I explained that a functional approach vindicates the constitutional design,
while at the same time preserving the separation of powers concerns that undergird the importance of
standing as a gatekeeper in this area. See id.
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However, that is not the whole picture. The constitutional scheme
assigns certain responsibilities to states and assumes that states retain
certain responsibilities that predate the Constitution but that the
Constitution preserves. 163 Interference by the federal government in a
state’s ability to fulfill these responsibilities imposes an “injury” on the
state’s functional role within the constitutional structure and should also
meet the “injury in fact” requirement.
The notion that states should have a constitutionally protected
function that can give rise to an injury should not be surprising. While the
Constitution does not create the states (unlike the Houses of Congress), the
Constitution clearly assumes their continued existence and incorporates
states into the federal design. 164
A major role for the states under the constitutional design is to ensure
the continued health and well-being of their citizens. 165 The surest route the
Constitution uses to protect the state’s ability to pursue this role is to
preserve, in general, the state’s prerogative to exercise its police power. 166
This logic supports Professor Grove’s argument that states have standing to
challenge the validity of federal government efforts to preempt state law. 167
While this argument is not (as I discuss below) inconsistent with sovereign
preemption state standing, 168 a state’s standing to challenge federal
preemption does not equate to, nor does it subsume, sovereign preemption
163

See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838–39 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens
would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the
other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing
two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it. It is appropriate to recall these
origins, which instruct us as to the nature of the two different governments created and confirmed by
the Constitution.”).
164 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (“The allocation of powers in our
federal system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States. The federal
balance is, in part, an end in itself, to ensure that States function as political entities in their own right.”;
cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999) (“[T]he Constitution was understood, in light of its
history and structure, to preserve the States’ traditional immunity from private suits.”).
165 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)
(surveying prior decisions to conclude that “a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and wellbeing – both physical and economic – of its residents in general”).
166
See, e.g., supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision in Bond v.
United States). Along similar lines, certain canons of construction applicable in federal court also
recognize, and act to preserve, state legislative authority and core state functions. See, e.g., Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484–85 (1996) (describing the canon against preemption of state law);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469–70 (1991) (describing the canon in favor of values of
federalism).
167 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
168 See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
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state standing. State standing to challenge the federal government’s action
is not limited to settings where the state challenges the legality of the
federal government’s effort at preemption; indeed, state standing may
persist even after the courts have upheld the federal government’s
preemption of state law.
It is beyond cavil that the Constitution authorizes, and sometimes
itself effects, the preemption of some state law. Upon entering the Union,
the states delegated many powers to the federal government, including the
power to preempt state law over additional areas of regulatory ambit. 169 But
this loss of power need not translate to a loss of function: Simply because a
state lacks power directly to implement a regulatory response to a problem
does not mean that it must abandon its function of trying to protect its
citizenry from falling victim to that problem. An injury to the state’s ability
to ensure the protection of its citizens inures to the detriment of the citizens
themselves; it is, in other words, an injury that should give the state parens
patriae standing. In such settings, the state may have standing to challenge
the federal government’s decision to address a problem with one level (or
type) of regulation (including no regulation) where the federal government
has at the same time acted to preclude the state from exercising its own
power to protect its citizens as it (the state) sees fit. 170
2. A Functional Approach
The vertical separation of powers concerns described above may arise
in many instances of preemption. That said, standing does not inhere in
every instance of valid federal preemption of state law. Nor is it sufficient
if the federal government in its stead chooses a level (or means) of
protection different from that which the state, given its druthers, would
have adopted. Indeed, two categories of settings leap to mind where this
combination should not translate to a parens patriae injury.
First, under the constitutional design, states completely surrender
some of their prerogatives to the national government. Some powers thus
become entirely off-limits to the states because the Constitution delegates
them solely to the federal government. For example, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Commerce Clause to preempt certain state regulation

169

See infra text accompanying notes 171–73.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (“When a State enters the Union, it
surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and
in some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions
might well be pre-empted.”).
170
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automatically, without any action on the part of the national government. 171
As to such matters, the states have no function and, therefore, can suffer no
injury172—even if the federal government implements no regulation in the
wake of the preemption, thus leaving a regulatory void.
Second, the Constitution has been interpreted to empower Congress to
expropriate additional powers from the states beyond those already
constitutionally assigned to the national government: For example,
Congress has used the Commerce Clause as a basis for enacting federal
environmental legislation that (to some degree at least) often preempts
conflicting state law. 173 In recognition of this fact, the Court historically
declined to recognize a state’s injury where it simply alleged that federal
legislation was not in the state’s interest or in the broad interest of its
citizenry.174 As the Court routinely explained, the federal government fills
the role of parens patriae as too do the states.175 The mere fact that two
levels of government disagree about how (or sometimes even whether) to
address a problem that affects some citizens does not mean that the state is
not meeting its responsibility of protecting its citizens. After all, the duly
elected representatives of the citizens in Washington and the duly elected
representatives of the citizens in the state capital may have a different view
of how to address a problem, 176 and under the Constitution, the former will

171 See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980) (“Although the [Commerce]
Clause . . . speaks in terms of powers bestowed upon Congress, the Court long has recognized that it
also limits the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade.”).
172 Of course, a state government and the federal government may contest the proper boundary of
the automatic preemption, in which case a state would have standing to argue that its state regulation
falls beyond the ambit of the dormant Commerce Clause’s automatic preemption. See, e.g., Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 132–37 (1986) (holding that the State had standing to appeal a judgment
reversing a conviction under a federal law that incorporated state law on the grounds that state law was
preempted by the Commerce Clause, even where the federal government—the original prosecutor—
sided with the criminal defendant and agreed not to pursue appeal).
173
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a) (2012) (Clean Air Act provision finding that air pollution often
crosses state lines and has an impact on commercial values and activities); id. § 7543(a) (provision
generally prohibiting states from imposing emissions-control requirements on new motor vehicles); see
also Clean Air Mkts. Grp. v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that certain state law
provisions were impliedly preempted by the Clean Air Act).
174 See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts v. Mellon in this
regard).
175 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts v. Mellon).
176 As I have explained elsewhere:
[T]here may be a dispute between the federal and state governments as to the proper normative
measure or approach [to the problem]. Perhaps the state government does not believe that costbenefit analysis should justify regulation, while the federal government does; or the state and
federal governments agree on the validity of cost-benefit analysis, yet they disagree as to the
assumptions underlying that analysis; or the state government takes a more precautionary
approach than does the federal government.
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trump the latter. Moreover, as Professor Herbert Wechsler pointed out, the
states themselves enjoy de facto representation in the Houses of
Congress.177 A similar story unfolds where the Executive Branch validly
receives from Congress, and exercises, the power to preempt state law.178
On the other hand, where the federal government has preempted state
law and the Executive Branch modulates its administration of the laws
enacted by Congress, the argument that the state has suffered an injury to
its ability to protect its citizens is stronger (at least where the preemption
prevents the state from acting on its own to remedy the situation). First, the
claim that the federal government is clearly acting as the constitutionally
authorized substitute parens patriae for the state is subject to doubt. To the
extent that the Executive Branch has improperly substituted its choice of
regulatory level for that of the Congress, there is an argument that the
state’s citizenry writ large has suffered an injury. 179

Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1019 (2010). See generally id.
at 1052–62.
177 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546–60 (1954); see
also Nash, supra note 36, at 372.
178 Commentators are divided on whether agencies should have the power to preempt state law.
Compare Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695,
708–25 (2008) (arguing that institutional competence and separation of powers weigh in favor of
Congress making preemption choices, and so the standard presumption against preemption should apply
with even greater force against agency preemption), Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional
Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 766–69 (2008) (contending that courts should uphold agency
preemption only where Congress has delegated such authority), Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 781, 796–800 (2008) (emphasizing, despite its shortcomings,
Congress’s institutional advantages in making preemption decisions), Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina
Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND
REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 13, 27 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (taking a skeptical
view of agency preemption), Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 871
(2008) (advocating restricting the freedom of agencies to preempt unilaterally), with Brian Galle &
Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge
of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1990 (2008) (arguing that agencies may be better positioned than
Congress to decide whether preemption of state law is appropriate), Metzger, supra note 153, at 2069–
72 (arguing that existing administrative law requirements may facilitate the inclusion of states’ interests
in administrative decisions), Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 477–502 (2008) (arguing in favor of agency reference of
preemption decisions, with judicial review to ensure proper administrative process), and Catherine M.
Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law Products Liability Claims, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 437, 441–46 (2009) (making the same argument); see also William W. Buzbee, State
Greenhouse Gas Regulation, Federal Climate Change Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, 1 SAN
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 23, 26 (2009) (arguing in favor of an independent “Preemption
Review Committee” that would render preemption decisions in problematic settings based on statutory
criteria and record evidence).
179 See Massey, supra note 146, at 263–64; Nash, supra note 176, at 1072–73.
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Second, while the states enjoy some effective representation in the
selection of the President, that representation pales in comparison to the
state’s effective representation in and influence over Congress. 180 Thus, to
the extent that the Executive Branch has indeed chosen—without proper
authority—to implement a statute at a level different from that chosen by
Congress, one would have greater concern that the constitutional design
may be frustrated. After all, if one of the justifications for the delegation of
power—even some police power traditionally exercised by the states—to
the federal government is that that power would be exercised by a federal
actor subject to the influence of the states—i.e., the Legislative Branch—
the possibility that the Executive Branch is underexerting that appropriated
power (at least as measured against Congress’s wishes) raises a concern.
That standing arises out of the states’ constitutional function explains
why states sometimes may have standing to challenge Executive Branch
underenforcement while private actors may not. Like states, private actors
may be frustrated by Executive Branch underenforcement. Unlike states,
however, private actors have no justiciable stake in the constitutional
separation of powers. Indeed, the Court’s assertion that states enjoy
“special solicitude” in the standing calculus 181 makes good sense when
understood in this context. While the injury Executive Branch
underenforcement inflicts on private actors is likely generalized and,
therefore, insufficient to support standing, courts should afford “special
solicitude” to states seeking to advance such claims by recognizing that
Executive Branch underenforcement gives rise to an injury to a state’s
quasi-sovereign interests.
From a functional approach to state standing emerge the core elements
for sovereign preemption state standing. First, the state must allege that the
Executive Branch has underenforced the federal law in a way that is
inconsistent with a governing statute. Second, the state must be able to
point to preemption of state law. In particular, either the preemption of

180 See Massey, supra note 146, at 267 (“The method of electing Congress provides a ‘procedural
safeguard’ for state polities that is wholly absent with respect to administrative agencies.”); Nash, supra
note 36, at 372 (“Since the President is the only federal official elected nationwide—and indeed with a
constituency that crosses any state boundary—the bulk of state political protection is provided by
Congress (and perhaps especially by the Senate).”); Wechsler, supra note 177, at 558 (“It is in light of
th[e] inherent tendency [of the government to preserve the domain of the states], reflected most
importantly in Congress, that the governmental power distribution clauses of the Constitution gain their
largest meaning as an instrument for the protection of the states. Those clauses, as is well known, have
served far more to qualify or stop intrusive legislative measures in the Congress than to invalidate
enacted legislation in the Supreme Court.”).
181 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007); see supra text accompanying notes 142–147.
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state law must be obvious and clear from a federal statute;182 the federal
government must have previously sought, or be concurrently seeking, to
preempt state law; or the preemption must otherwise already have been
determined judicially. I refer to this as a “preemption exhaustion”
requirement; such a threshold requirement makes sense because the
underenforcement of federal law would not injure the state and its citizens
were state law not preempted. 183 Finally, there must be a nexus between the
area of preemption and the area in which the Executive Branch is allegedly
underenforcing federal law.
B. Consistency of Sovereign Preemption State Standing with Existing
Standing Precedent and Doctrine
How does sovereign preemption state standing square with existing
standing doctrine and prior precedent? The answer is that it squares rather
well.
1. Consistency with Precedent
Consider first the consistency of sovereign preemption state standing
with existing precedent on state standing to sue the federal government.
The value of sovereign preemption state standing is readily apparent when
we reconsider Massachusetts v. EPA. Lurking in the background of the
litigation were the facts that (1) the Clean Air Act empowers California to
promulgate its own motor vehicle emissions standards with a waiver from
EPA184 (which other states can then choose to follow in lieu of governing
federal standards);185 (2) California had in fact requested a waiver from
EPA to issue standards for motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions; 186 and
(3) the same logic that motivated EPA to argue in the Massachusetts
litigation that it lacked statutory authority to regulate motor vehicle
greenhouse gas emissions also convinced it to decline to act on California’s
waiver request while the Massachusetts litigation was pending. 187 In effect,
182 If the preemption is effected automatically by the Constitution, then the matter is something that
the Constitution commits to the federal government, and the state can claim no injury in how the federal
government (or the Executive Branch) decides to regulate in response to the matter.
183 Cf. Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Legislative Exhaustion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1253, 1314–18
(2017) (arguing in favor of Congress first exhausting its opportunity to resolve a conflict with the
Executive Branch nonjudicially as a prerequisite for congressional standing).
184
See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012). While not explicit, the wording of the statute authorizes only
California to generate motor vehicle emissions standards. See Wildermuth, supra note 146, at 318.
185 See 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2012); Wildermuth, supra note 146, at 318.
186 See Wildermuth, supra note 146, at 318–19.
187 See id. (“Although California applied for approval of its new standards in December 2005 the
EPA would not consider California’s request because California’s regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions was flatly inconsistent with the EPA’s reading of [the Clean Air Act] in the decision under
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then, the Massachusetts case was litigated in the shadow of looming federal
preemption of state police power (that Congress under the Clean Air Act
had chosen to preserve). As language in the Court’s opinion reflects, the
Court understood Massachusetts’s injury to result not from the preemption
of state law but rather from the absence of regulation that would result from
the combination of (a) preemption of the State’s prerogative to regulate,
and (b) the assertion of the federal government that, even while it precluded
State regulation, it too lacked the power to regulate. 188
Notably, while Professor Grove’s theory—that preemption of state
law provides a sufficient injury for the standing calculus—is fine as far as it
goes, it offers no justification for the Court’s conclusion in Massachusetts.
After all, as Professor Grove herself points out in criticizing positions taken
by Professor Metzger and by me, how could the injury be preemption of
state law when, if the State obtained the relief it sought (in this case,
obtaining a declaration that EPA could and should regulate motor vehicle
greenhouse gas emissions), that injury would remain in place? 189 Professor
Grove’s criticism misconstrues what I believe to be the relevant injury: the
harm to the citizens of the State resulting from the regulatory void. 190 Once
one defines the injury thus, it is apparent that obtaining the relief the State
sought would indeed address that injury.
review in Massachusetts.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 319 (“[I]t is striking that when the Court
ruled in favor of a different interpretation of [the Clean Air Act than that advanced by the EPA] and
remanded the issue to the EPA, the EPA immediately changed its position. Two days after the Court’s
Massachusetts opinion was issued, the EPA announced that it would notice California’s request and
schedule both a public comment period and public hearings as required [by statute].”).
188 The Court explained:
When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives.
Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it
cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some circumstances the exercise
of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted.
These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal Government, and Congress
has ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing standards applicable to
the “emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicle engines, which
in [the Administrator’s] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012)).
189 Professor Grove argues:
[I]n Massachusetts v. EPA, the State’s sovereign injury—the inability to regulate—was caused
not by the EPA’s inaction, but by the provision of the Clean Air Act that prohibits Massachusetts
from regulating motor vehicle emissions. And the only way to redress the State’s sovereign injury
was to lift the preemption—and thereby allow the State to “exercise . . . its police powers” to
regulate motor vehicle emissions itself. The State would continue to suffer the injury identified by
Professors Metzger and Nash—the inability to regulate—no matter what the EPA did (or failed to
do).
Grove, supra note 4, at 889 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519).
190 Instead, Professor Grove erroneously asserts that “the injury identified by Professor Metzger
and Nash” was the State’s “inability to regulate.” Id.
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Beyond settings like Massachusetts, how does sovereign preemption
state standing interact with, and affect, other areas where the courts have
recognized state standing to sue the federal government? Here, it is
important to understand the limited scope of sovereign preemption state
standing. The doctrine would have no impact on cases where states allege
direct injury and thus readily coexists with Professor Vladeck’s acceptance
of the holdings in those cases as relatively easy. 191 The doctrine also in no
way would change the result in any of the competing parens patriae cases
above192: States still would not have standing in such cases. 193
Nor would the doctrine impede the conclusion that standing inheres in
cases where the state alleges an injury simply due to the preemption of its
sovereign police powers (whether the Legislative or Executive Branches
effected the alleged preemption). Thus, the conclusions that the States had
standing in Missouri v. Holland and Colorado v. Toll would stand. 194
Indeed, if Professor Grove is correct that the mere preemption of state law
by the federal government should give rise to an injury sufficient to support
standing,195 then the point of sovereign preemption state standing is to
preserve the freedom of the state not only to seek to regain its lost police
powers (by asserting preemption as its injury) but also to accept the
preemption (or at least to accept an adjudication of the validity of the
preemption) and to seek to force the federal government to live up to its
obligation to regulate in its place.
2. Consistency with Current Doctrine
As discussed above, sovereign preemption state standing nicely
complements Professor Grove’s argument in favor of state standing to
challenge the validity of the preemption of state law. In some sense, the
latter will often be the precursor to the former. A determination that the
federal government has properly preempted state law may leave the state
with a basis to sue if the Executive Branch underenforces the federal law
that Congress enacted to fill the void left by the state law preemption.

191

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.
193 In a competing parens patriae case, the State complains that the federal government’s regulatory
response to a problem inadequately protects the State’s citizenry. Since there is no allegation in such a
case that the federal Executive Branch is underenforcing federal law, there would be no sovereign
preemption state standing.
194 See supra notes 91–104 and accompanying text.
195 I believe that Professor Grove is correct that mere preemption of state law is sufficient for
standing, at least if the preempted state law goes to the state’s police power. I conclude that Professor
Grove’s argument in the subsequent part of her Article relating to conflict over horizontal separation of
powers is erroneous.
192
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In contrast, sovereign preemption state standing is entirely
inconsistent with Professor Grove’s argument that a state ought to have no
standing to raise concerns of horizontal separation of powers. 196 After all,
sovereign preemption state standing is premised on the existence of
Executive Branch underenforcement of federal statutory law. Professor
Grove argues that the notion that a state could ever sue the federal
government based on Executive Branch underenforcement “seems to rest
on an assumption that States have a greater stake in the executive’s
compliance with federal statutes than other members of society—private
parties, localities, and even Congress.” 197 But, as I explain below, sovereign
preemption state standing does not require the states to have a greater stake
in the executive’s compliance with federal statutes. Rather, it stems from
the idea that, because other actors may not have standing to challenge
Executive Branch noncompliance, 198 the state ought to have the chance to
use its parens patriae authority to protects its constituents.
Beyond doctrinal analysis, Professor Grove tries to bolster her
argument against state standing to challenge Executive Branch
noncompliance by suggesting that the political aspirations of state attorneys
general means that they “are not likely to be particularly savvy overseers of
the federal executive’s implementation of federal law.”199 Professor Grove
thus advances the argument that, to the extent that state attorneys general
are today more likely to bring suits for political reasons, 200 functionalist
grounds suggest that the federal courts should be less welcoming to these
suits.
I find this argument unconvincing. First, as Professor Grove herself
seems to concede, it seems odd to have the scope of standing enjoyed by a
category of plaintiffs turn on the possible motivation of the plaintiffs’
counsel.201 The injury (if one exists), and the right to vindicate it, belong to
the state. That should not—and, it seems, legally cannot—change simply
because a state has (as states generally have) chosen to vest the authority to

196

See Grove, supra note 4, at 885–99.
Id. at 892 (footnote omitted).
198 See infra notes 218–220 and accompanying text.
199 Grove, supra note 4, at 897.
200 See Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as
National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525, 538 (1994).
201 Professor Grove herself notes that her argument to limit state standing based on horizontal
separation of powers conflicts “relies primarily on constitutional principle and precedent.” Grove, supra
note 4, at 895. That being the case, this portion of her argument—based as it is upon the presumed
motivations of state lawyers filing suit—is an odd addition to Professor Grove’s principal argument.
197
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bring suit in the person of an elected official. 202 To put the point another
way, whether a plaintiff has standing or not ought not to turn on the
motivations (or speculation about the motivations) of the attorney bringing
the suit.203 Second, to the extent that political aspirations may motivate state
attorneys general to bring frivolous suits, they face sanctions for doing so
(as do all attorneys who bring frivolous suits). 204 Third, even if the
argument might otherwise have weight, the factual predicate is far from
clear; Professor Massey has argued to the contrary that the offices of state
attorneys general actually “have limited resources and are politically
constrained,”205 and as such will likely focus on “[o]nly particularly
egregious executive violations of public rights.” 206 Finally, to whatever
extent Professor Grove’s concerns about state attorneys general prove true,
sovereign preemption standing is narrow enough to allay concerns over the
efforts of state attorneys general to rely on it more often than they should.
Finally, sovereign preemption state standing is not technically
inconsistent with Professor Roesler’s argument in favor of state standing to
sue the federal government over a jointly administered federal program. 207
On the other hand, my approach and Professor Roesler’s rest on very
different premises: On Professor Roesler’s account, standing arises out of
joint administration of regulatory programs by the state and federal
governments.208 On my account, standing arises from a lack of agreement
between the federal Executive and Legislative Branches, which runs to the
detriment of the states’ ability to protect their citizens. Moreover, if states
could make use of both approaches, they could conceivably challenge a
sizeable number of federal actions. Given the largely unrelated logical
202 Professor Grove does not explain why these same elected officials are better situated to assess
when to bring actions challenging the preemption of state law (or, alternatively, why this concern does
not figure into standing to challenge preemption).
203 It would similarly be odd to deny standing in class action cases because of a perception that
counsel in those cases had ulterior motives for choosing to represent classes in those cases.
204 That the injury, and the claim associated with it, belong to the plaintiff state does not preclude
the attorney representing the state from facing sanctions for bringing a frivolous claim. Provisions
authorizing sanctions against attorneys contain no exception for state attorneys general. See, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (authorizing sanctions against “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to
conduct cases in any court of the United States”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (authorizing sanctions against
“any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule”); Husain v. Springer, No. 97 CV
2982(NG)(CLP), 2005 WL 1502897, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2005) (imposing nominal monetary
sanctions against the Office of the New York State Attorney General under § 1927); Enriquez v.
Estelle, 837 F. Supp. 830, 834 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (imposing monetary sanctions against the Attorney
General of Texas).
205 Massey, supra note 146, at 274.
206 Id. at 279.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 159–60.
208 See id.
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underpinnings of the two arguments, it is not surprising that, as my
discussion of particular cases below reveals, the classes of cases where
states would have standing to sue the federal government under his
conception of state standing and mine do not substantially overlap. 209
Overall, sovereign preemption state standing squares nicely with
existing precedent, as well as with current notions of state standing to sue
the federal government.
3. Consistency with Standing Doctrine’s Function
Does sovereign preemption state standing also square with the
function of standing doctrine generally? The answer again is affirmative.
One purpose of standing is simply to limit the number of cases that
reach the federal courts. 210 Of course, if one disagrees with my argument
above that sovereign preemption state standing is consistent with existing
Court precedent, then one likely believes that the doctrine will expand the
universe of cases that currently can be heard in federal court. Even then the
number of additional cases will likely remain small. The requirements for
sovereign preemption state standing are exacting. Moreover, the courts can
apply the doctrine in a way that limits its availability only to settings
where—as Professor Woolhandler suggests—Congress has explicitly
authorized the plaintiff state’s case by generating a statutory cause of
action.211
Nor does the implementation of sovereign preemption state standing
frustrate Professor Maxwell Stearns’s argument that standing doctrine
serves to discourage attempts by litigants to manipulate courts’ dockets. 212
209 I argue below that sovereign preemption state standing would be available in United States v.
Texas but not in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, see infra Sections II.D.1–2, while Professor
Roesler argued that the state should have standing in Virginia but not Texas, see Roesler, supra note 33,
at 695–702.
210 See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 89 (2012) (noting
that an “objection to expanding standing . . . is that it would open the floodgates of litigation and
overburden the federal dockets”).
211 See Woolhandler, supra note 29, at 212. Such a cause of action might currently be authorized
by the Constitution or by the Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (granting a
right to judicial review to a person affected by agency action). But see Armstrong v. Exceptional Child
Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383–84 (2015) (holding that the Supremacy Clause does not give rise to a
private right of action); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828–35 (1985) (holding that the
Administrative Procedure Act provides no private right of action to challenge an agency’s exercise of
its discretion not to act).
212 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice,
83 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1323 (1995) (noting that standing is a “device used by federal courts to fend
off challenges to governmental conduct that are brought primarily on an ideological basis”); see also
Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court—A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 672–
73, 683–85 (1973) (arguing that standing serves the purpose of rationing scarce judicial resources and
defining the courts’ policymaking role). See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice:
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Once again, the requirements of the doctrine are too demanding to allow
litigants—here, states—to bring suits in the hopes of manipulating the
federal courts’ dockets.
And, to the extent that one believes that a goal of standing doctrine is
to validate the separation of powers among the branches of government, 213
sovereign preemption state standing does not undermine that goal.
Sovereign preemption state standing requires a true parens patriae injury to
the state. The adversity between the parties is real, and the dispute does
indeed resemble a case that might traditionally come before a court. 214
C. Nuances
This Section discusses nuances that attend the recognition of
sovereign preemption state standing. It first discusses the proper level of
stringency for sovereign preemption state standing’s nexus requirement.
Second, it addresses how, and whether, sovereign preemption state
standing might extend to cases of Executive Branch overenforcement (as
opposed to Executive Branch underenforcement) of federal law. Third, the
Section highlights that sovereign preemption state standing speaks to the
outer boundaries of Article III standing and, thus, leaves Congress free not
to provide standing under statutory causes of action it enacts. Finally, it
discusses the interplay between sovereign preemption state standing and
the bar against standing for generalized grievances.
The Stringency of Sovereign Preemption State Standing’s Nexus
Requirement
Sovereign preemption state standing requires a nexus between the area
in which the federal government has preempted or is seeking to preempt
state law and the area of law in which the Executive Branch is allegedly
underenforcing federal law. But how close a nexus is required? If the areas
of law must be identical, then sovereign preemption state standing will be
rather narrow. Given the functional basis for sovereign preemption state
standing, it makes more sense to look for substantial overlap between the
goal of the law that the Executive Branch is allegedly underenforcing and
1.

Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995) (drawing on historical evidence and case law to
support point that standing doctrines prevent manipulation).
213 But see Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 474–75, 483–92,
497–500 (2008) (critiquing the notion that standing doctrine in fact can and should serve to validate
separation of powers goals).
214 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (“[T]he business of federal courts [is limited]
to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution
through the judicial process.”). To the extent that separation of powers concerns are seen to preclude, or
at least guard against, the assertion of generalized grievances, I argue below that sovereign preemption
state standing does not run afoul of this notion. See infra Section II.C.4.
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the goal of the preempted state law. To be sure, any such analysis is bound
to be somewhat subjective. Still, the success courts have had with similar
inquiries—consider the definition of the relevant “field” of law in deciding
whether Congress has effected “field preemption” 215—suggests that the
courts would be well positioned to undertake such an analysis in this
setting.
2.

Should Sovereign Preemption State Standing Extend to Cases of
Executive Overenforcement of Federal Law?
As I have described sovereign preemption state standing to this point,
it permits a state to allege that the Executive Branch has underenforced
existing federal statutory law. But should such standing also apply where
the state alleges an overenforcement of federal law by the Executive
Branch, i.e., wherever the state can allege a difference between Congress’s
enforcement expectations (as expressed in the governing statute) and the
Executive Branch’s enforcement practices? Indeed, one might criticize the
narrower version of sovereign preemption state standing as biased in favor
of obtaining increasing levels of regulation.
While it would not be inconceivable to have a broader conception of
sovereign preemption state standing that embraces alleged Executive
Branch overenforcement of federal law, there are justifications for adhering
to the narrower conception. First, the functional justification for sovereign
preemption state standing is to ensure that the state’s police power does not
go underutilized, even when expropriated by the federal government. But
the essence of the police power consists of the power affirmatively to
regulate, not the power to abstain from regulation. 216 It thus ought not to be
surprising that a valid conception of sovereign preemption state standing
might be biased in favor of generating more regulation.
Second, concerns of democratic accountability give rise to a related
justification for restricting sovereign preemption state standing to cases of
alleged Executive Branch underenforcement. To the extent that a problem
facing the state falls within the scope of problems ordinarily dealt with by
215 See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 685, 744–47 (1991) (discussing how courts are equipped—in cases where field preemption is at
issue—to deal with arguments by parties, and ambiguity over what the relevant field of law is).
Consider as well the analysis courts undertake in an antitrust case to determine the “relevant market.”
See generally Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123
(1992). The nexus inquiry I set out here would also invite courts to engage in a form of purposivism,
despite the drift of judges in recent decades away from purposivism and toward textualism. Still, that
some purposivist analysis might be involved is not surprising given the role of preemption in the
sovereign preemption state standing analysis. See generally Note, Preemption as Purposivism’s Last
Refuge, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (2013).
216 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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the state government, the citizens of a state reasonably might not
understand that the state government was disempowered from acting217 or
that the Executive Branch was responsible for underenforcing the federal
legislature’s directive. On the other hand, it is harder to see how the
citizens of a state might blame state government for the Executive Branch’s
overenforcement of federal law.
A third and final justification, is the general point (perhaps prudential)
that it is less important to stretch standing doctrine to recognize a plaintiff’s
standing where another plaintiff has clear standing. 218 The Court has made
this point in particular in the context of would-be governmental plaintiffs,
noting the reduced need to find standing for such plaintiffs where a “private
plaintiff” likely has standing to raise the same issue. 219 Settings of alleged
overregulation will more likely generate private plaintiffs directly affected
by the allegedly overregulatory behavior 220 than will settings of
underregulatory behavior. For that reason, states need less opportunity to
challenge Executive Branch overenforcement. By contrast, the likely
absence of a private plaintiff in cases of alleged Executive Branch
underenforcement supports state standing.
3.

Sovereign Preemption State Standing Meets the Article III
Standard but Does Not Speak to Statutory Standing
The functional considerations on which sovereign preemption state
standing rests relate to Article III standing. The fact that a state has
sovereign preemption standing says nothing about whether the state has
valid standing under a congressional statute (any more than the fact that a
statutory grant of state standing would negate the Article III standing

217 Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (“Accountability is thus diminished
when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the
local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.”).
218 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 614 (2007) (plurality
opinion) (“[R]espondents make no effort to show that these improbable abuses could not be challenged
in federal court by plaintiffs who would possess standing based on grounds other than taxpayer
standing.”).
219
See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (noting that holding that members of
Congress lacked standing did not “foreclose[] the Act from constitutional challenge (by someone who
suffers judicially cognizable injury as a result of the Act),” while also observing that the Court “need
not now decide” whether the outcome would have been different were a private plaintiff unavailable or
unable to proceed); cf. South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1984) (holding that the AntiInjunction Act should not apply to preclude state suit, reasoning that even though in theory a private
plaintiff still could bring suit and raise the same question, “it is by no means certain that the State would
be able to convince a [private party] to raise its claims”).
220 See infra text accompanying note 263.
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requirement221). I note that my conception of sovereign preemption state
standing is consistent with the notion, advanced by Professor
Woolhandler,222 that federal courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction to
hear a state’s claim unless a statute authorizes the federal courts to hear the
claim.223
4.

The Interplay Between Sovereign Preemption State Standing and
the Bar Against Standing for Generalized Grievances
The Supreme Court has explained that a party generally has standing
only for “particularized grievances,” and not for generalized grievances
that are shared by too many citizens. 224 One could take the position that the
bar against generalized grievances applies as well in the context of
sovereign preemption state standing.
Scholars debate whether the bar against standing for generalized
grievances is constitutional or merely prudential. 225 To the extent it is
merely prudential, it does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to sovereign
preemption state standing. Indeed, one might interpret the Massachusetts
Court’s invocation of the “special solicitude” of the states in the standing
calculus as a suggestion that the generalized grievance prudential
restriction should not apply in cases of state standing 226 (or at least in cases
of sovereign preemption state sanding).
On the other hand, even if the “particularized grievance” requirement
does apply in sovereign preemption state standing cases (whether because
the requirement is constitutional, or because, though prudential, courts
should generally apply the doctrine even to assertions of standing by
221

To put this another way, Congress cannot grant standing beyond that which Article III
authorizes. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“The Court’s holding that there is an outer limit to the power of Congress to confer rights of action is a
direct and necessary consequence of the case and controversy limitations found in Article III.”).
222 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
223 Other subconstitutional standing doctrines are similarly consistent with sovereign preemption
state standing. See Massey, supra note 146, at 279 (arguing that the political question doctrine can be
applied in cases where states rely on parens patriae standing); infra text accompanying note 225
(discussing the possibility that the “bar” against standing for generalized grievances is
subconstitutional).
224 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755–56 (1984) (rejecting an “abstract stigmatic
injury . . . [that] would extend nationwide to all members of the particular racial groups against which
the Government was alleged to be discriminating”).
225
For discussion, see e.g., Nash, supra note 44, at 1305 & n.132. For a discussion of how the
Court has variously treated the requirement as constitutional and prudential, see Craig A. Stern, Another
Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a Constitutional or Prudential Test of Federal
Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1204–17 (2008).
226 See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing Doctrine Abolished or Waiting for a
Comeback?: Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 213, 238
(2015) (making such a suggestion).
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states), and even if the “particularized grievance” requirement acts to
preclude many cases where sovereign preemption state standing would
otherwise apply, the doctrine still would have significant purchase. This is
because there remain cases where some states actually have particularized
claims, i.e., have parens patriae claims that other states do not.
Indeed, the two cases I discussed in the Introduction provide examples
of settings where sovereign preemption state standing might apply 227 and
where some state plaintiffs would have particularized claims. Consider first
the setting of global warming as exemplified in Massachusetts v. EPA.
Leaving to the side the fact that the Court there seemed to rely on
Massachusetts’ actual ownership of coastline that would disappear with
rising sea levels resulting from global warming, the fact remains that
coastal states face far more of a risk from global warming than inland
states.228 Indeed, some states in the plains may actually benefit from some
degree of global warming. 229 In short, Louisiana and Florida could have
alleged particularized injuries as a result of EPA’s failure to regulate
greenhouse gas tailpipe emissions. 230
United States v. Texas addresses allegations by numerous states that
the Executive Branch improperly underenforced the immigration laws. And
in the context of illegal immigration, the Supreme Court has previously
recognized that some states bear greater harm than others. 231 These states
presumably could satisfy the particularized grievance requirement.
D. Applying Sovereign Preemption State Standing
How might sovereign preemption state standing apply in disputes
recently and currently before the courts? This Part explores how sovereign
preemption state standing would apply, or not apply, in actual cases (and in

227

See supra notes 7–22 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Susan Muller, Unprecedented Harm: Will the Roberts Court Recognize the Distinction
Between Global Warming and Its Effects?, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 317, 338 (2010) (“A perhaps more
obvious feature of sea level rise is that it has no impact on people living away from coasts, while people
living on coasts and owners of coastal property are affected in a very concrete and personal way . . . .”).
229 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 1, 33 (2007) (“On some estimates, American agriculture will actually be a net winner as a result
of climate change.”).
230
See also supra note 156 (discussing Professor Wildermuth’s argument that California was in a
unique position to sue the EPA for its failure to regulate tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions, given the
special status that California enjoys under the Clean Air Act to promulgate motor vehicle emissions
standards).
231 See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (noting that “local problems” associated with
the employment of illegal immigrants “are particularly acute in California in light of the significant
influx into that State of illegal aliens from neighboring Mexico.”).
228
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one hypothetical case based on an actual case) recently brought before the
federal courts.
1. State Standing in United States v. Texas
Consider first United States v. Texas.232 As noted above, the Court
affirmed, by tie vote, the existence of Texas’s standing to challenge the
alleged underenforcement of the federal immigration laws by the Obama
Administration. 233 As also noted above, Texas did what it could to define its
injury in terms of the existing pigeonholes of direct injury to the State—
there, the cost of issuing more driver’s licenses—and of injury to a truly
sovereign interest, the issuance of driver’s licenses. 234
Sovereign preemption state standing provides a better fit. The
regulation of immigration is a core police power that the states have largely
ceded to the federal government. Indeed, the federal government recently
relied on the federal courts to validate a strong understanding of the
preemption of state powers in the area. In 2010, Arizona enacted the
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (the Arizona
law) with the express goal of “discourag[ing] and deter[ring] the unlawful
entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully
present in the United States.” 235 The Obama Administration opposed the
Arizona law from its enactment 236 and promptly filed suit against the State
to enjoin the law’s implementation. 237
The litigation ultimately reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which
largely accepted the federal government’s argument that federal law
preempted the Arizona law. 238 The Court held that federal law preempted
Arizona law provisions that (1) made it a misdemeanor under state law to
fail to comply with federal alien-registration requirements,239 (2) made it a
misdemeanor under state law for an alien without authority to be in the
United States to seek, or engage in, work in Arizona,240 and (3) authorized a
232
Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir.
2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
233 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 16–17.
235 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 11-1051 editor’s note (2012)).
236 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Advocates of an Immigration Overhaul Question a Border
Deployment, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2010, at A22 (“Mr. Obama . . . condemned [the Arizona Law] on the
day it was signed into law.”).
237 See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir.
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
238 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501–10.
239 See id. at 2501–03 (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (2011)).
240 See id. at 2503–05 (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (2011)).
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police officer in the state to arrest without a warrant a person whom “the
officer has probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public offense
that makes the person removable from the United States.” 241
Given the preemption backdrop, the subsequent lawsuit by Texas
sought to protect the citizens of the states from the regulatory gap that
would, Texas argued, result from the underenforcement of the law by the
federal government. The only question possibly hindering the applicability
of sovereign preemption state standing is whether a sufficient nexus existed
between the federal government’s preemption of state law, on the one hand,
and the area of alleged underenforcement of federal law on the other. One
might argue that the Arizona criminal law and law enforcement provisions
that the Supreme Court invalidated differed in kind from the immigrationstatus laws that the Executive Branch had allegedly underenforced through
its issuance of DAPA. It seems, however, that a strong argument can be
made that the Arizona case vindicated the Executive Branch’s desire to
minimize the states’ role in immigration enforcement, while the issuance of
DAPA allegedly reflected the underenforcement of federal immigration
law.242 If so, then sovereign preemption state standing would apply.
2. State Standing in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius
Consider next the case of Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,243
where the State of Virginia, acting through its Attorney General, sought to
challenge the federal Affordable Care Act (ACA) on the ground that the
ACA’s “individual mandate”—which requires individuals to purchase
health insurance coverage or pay a penalty244—was an unconstitutional
exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. As its injury,
Virginia pointed to the preemption of a provision of its law—enacted
contemporaneously with the ACA—that provided that “[n]o resident of this
Commonwealth . . . shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of
individual insurance coverage.” 245 Here, sovereign preemption state

241 Id. at 2498 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(5) (2011)); see id. at 2505–07
(discussing that provision of the Arizona law). The Court also expressed suspicion over the viability of
a fourth provision, see id. at 2509–10, one that provided that “officers who conduct a stop, detention, or
arrest must in some circumstances make efforts to verify the person’s immigration status with the
Federal Government,” id. at 2498 (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012)). The Court
did not, however, declare that provision completely preempted. See id. at 2507–10 (discussing ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012)).
242 To the extent that the bar against generalized grievances is applicable in sovereign preemption
state standing cases, the grievance in United States v. Texas is likely sufficiently particularized. See
supra text accompanying note 231.
243 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011).
244 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)-(b) (2012).
245 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2017).
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preemption would not provide a basis for standing (and thus would not
change the result in the case246). Virginia did not meet either prong of the
doctrine. First, no issue of horizontal separation of powers existed: Virginia
challenged Congress’s ability to enact the ACA’s individual mandate in the
first place. In that sense, the alleged injury was really a “competing parens
patriae” assertion, which remains ineffective to establish standing. 247
Indeed, Virginia made no allegation in the case that the Executive Branch
was underenforcing federal law.
Second, even if Virginia had somehow raised a horizontal separation
of powers issue, the Commonwealth had not met the preemption
exhaustion requirement: the governing federal statute did not clearly and
obviously preempt Virginia law, and neither the State nor the federal
government took affirmative steps to determine whether Virginia law was
actually preempted. 248 In order for the possibility of a regulatory gap to be
imminent and nonconjectural, sovereign preemption state standing requires
that the preemption of state law be real and not just hypothetically
predicted. Here such imminence simply did not exist.
3. Oregon’s Claim in the Gonzales v. Oregon Litigation
Third, consider the dispute in Gonzales v. Oregon249 over Oregon’s
Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA).250 In order to achieve the statutory goal
of authorizing physician-assisted suicide and insulating physicians who
assisted in suicides, the ODWDA “exempts from civil or criminal liability
state-licensed physicians who, in compliance with the specific safeguards
in ODWDA, dispense or prescribe a lethal dose of drugs upon the request
of a terminally ill patient.” 251 This, however, led to a possible conflict with
federal law, since the federal Controlled Substance Act (CSA) regulated the
drugs that physicians prescribed under the ODWDA.252 The CSA groups
246 In the actual litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that
Virginia did not have standing to proceed. 656 F.3d at 269–73.
247 In effect, the Virginia case is the flip of what I call “null preemption.” Null preemption arises
when the federal government preempts state law and, by enacting nothing to fill the resulting gap,
leaves in its wake a regulatory void. See Nash, supra note 176, at 1039–47. Here, by contrast, it is the
State that prefers a regulatory void, while the federal government believes that regulation is the answer.
The simple constitutional answer is that, per the Supremacy Clause, Congress wins the battle between
the sovereigns.
248 On the question of whether the state had standing simply to challenge the preemption of state
law, Professor Grove explains, along somewhat similar lines, “I argue . . . that to the extent a state law
merely declares that private citizens are not subject to legal requirements, and does not seek to regulate
private citizens, that is not sufficient for standing purposes.” Grove, supra note 4, at 877.
249 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
250 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–897 (2015); Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 249.
251 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 249.
252 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2012).
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drugs into categories, or “schedules”; the schedule on which the drugs in
question appears renders that drug dispensable by a physician only directly
or by way of a prescription. 253 The CSA authorizes the Attorney General by
regulation to modify the schedule of drugs. 254 A 1971 regulation authorizes
physicians to dispense the drugs in question “for a legitimate medical
purpose.” 255 The CSA also sets up a registry for physicians; only registered
physicians may dispense regulated drugs. 256 Finally, the CSA includes a
provision confirming the continuing role of states in regulating in the area,
calling for the displacement of state law only where “there is a positive
conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that
the two cannot consistently stand together.”257
In 2001, the Attorney General issued an interpretive rule that cast
doubt on the continued vitality of the ODWDA. 258 The rule declared that
“assisting suicide is not a ‘legitimate medical purpose’ within the meaning”
of the Attorney General’s 1971 regulation. 259 Dispensing the drugs in
question, therefore, would constitute a violation of the CSA, and a
physician who in fact dispensed such drugs under the ODWDA would put
his or her registration at risk. 260 Finally, the interpretive rule expressly
endeavored to displace state law, explaining that “[t]he Attorney General’s
conclusion applies regardless of whether state law authorizes or permits
such conduct by practitioners or others.” 261
Would sovereign preemption state standing have provided a basis for
Oregon’s standing in the Gonzales v. Oregon litigation?262 No, unless the
doctrine extends to Executive Branch overenforcement of federal law.
Undoubtedly the interpretive rule explicitly sought to preempt state law.
But Oregon’s complaint was not that the Executive Branch was
underenforcing the CSA but rather that it was overenforcing it by extending
its reach to apply to actions otherwise protected under the ODWDA.
253

Id. § 829(a)–(b).
Id. § 811(a).
255 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2016).
256 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 822–824 (2012).
257 Id. § 903.
258 Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (Nov. 9, 2001).
259 Id. at 56,608.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262 In the actual case, the Supreme Court did not address standing. See Grove, supra note 4, at 873
n.118. The district court did address the state’s standing, and concluded that standing was proper. See
Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1087 (D. Or. 2002). However, the Ninth Circuit easily found
that intervening health care practitioners had standing, see Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1121 &
n.2 (9th Cir. 2004), which obviated the need to address any other plaintiff’s standing. The Supreme
Court presumably relied on this conclusion.
254
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Indeed, the actual procedural history of the Gonzales v. Oregon litigation
highlights one of the reasons I offered above for why sovereign preemption
state standing is not needed in cases of alleged Executive Branch
overenforcement: In the actual litigation, there were—as one would
generally expect in the setting of overenforcement—private parties who
could establish standing under the traditional test. 263
4.

A Lawsuit by Nebraska and Oklahoma Against the Federal
Government Arising out of Colorado’s Decriminalization of
Recreational Marijuana
Finally, consider a lawsuit that has yet to be brought but that would
arise out of the same dispute that has generated the Nebraska v. Colorado
litigation.264 In the actual case, Nebraska and Oklahoma sought to sue
Colorado under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, alleging that
Colorado’s legalization of recreational marijuana 265 had led to an influx of
marijuana into the plaintiff States and had generated high criminal
enforcement costs. 266 The Court declined the plaintiff Sates’ request to
exercise its original jurisdiction. 267 One could imagine, however, that the
plaintiff States might have thought of suing additionally (or instead) the
U.S. Attorney General, given that the Attorney General’s response to
Colorado’s legalization decision suggested as a matter of policy that
enforcement resources should be deployed with an eye to local legalization
laws.268 If Oklahoma had sued the Attorney General, would sovereign
preemption state standing apply?
No, the theory of sovereign preemption state standing outlined in this
Article would not grant Oklahoma standing in this hypothetical litigation.
To see this, note that the plaintiff States could not allege federal preemption

263

See text accompanying supra note 220.
Nebraska v. Colorado, 135 S. Ct. 2070 (2015) (invitation for Solicitor General to file a brief
expressing the views of the United States); see also Nebraska v. Colorado 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016)
(denial of motion for leave to file a bill of complaint).
265 Were the issue the legalization of medical marijuana, there clearly would be no sovereign
preemption state standing, because Congress itself has approved—indeed to some degree mandated—
the underenforcement of federal criminal drug laws in that context. Specifically, through riders to
appropriations bills, Congress has since 2014 prohibited the Department of Justice from using any of
the funds allocated to it in a way that would “prevent” a state from implementing state laws “that
authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.” United States v.
McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); id. at 1179 (allowing criminal
defendants an injunction against prosecutors based on these funding restrictions).
266 See Complaint at ¶¶ 7, 54–68, Nebraska v. Colorado, 135 S. Ct. 2070 (2015) (No. 144, Orig.).
267 Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016).
268 See, e.g., Todd Grabarsky, Conflicting Federal and State Medical Marijuana Policies: A Threat
to Cooperative Federalism, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2013).
264
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of their laws; rather, they would allege—and indeed have alleged—that
federal law effected preemption of a sister state’s law.
To be sure, the plaintiff States could allege that the Executive Branch
had unilaterally decided to underenforce governing federal law. But the
ability to allege a problem of horizontal separation of powers, while
necessary, is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of sovereign
preemption state standing. Sovereign preemption state standing rests on the
notion that the Executive Branch is underutilizing powers that the states
delegated to the federal government and that Congress in turn directed the
Executive Branch to employ. In contrast, preconstitutionally, no state had
the legal power to restrict a neighboring state’s exercise of its own police
powers. Indeed, as the Court noted in its 1906 decision in Missouri v.
Illinois, the interstate lawsuit that the Constitution created stands as a
substitute for diplomacy or the use of force. 269 Since a state never had the
power and, therefore, did not delegate to the federal government the power,
to compel a sister state to exert its own police powers, neither does it have
sovereign preemption state standing to challenge the federal government’s
failure to inhibit the sister state’s behavior in this regard.
In so concluding, I do not mean to argue that there is no theory under
which the plaintiff States might have standing to sue the federal
government. Perhaps there are other theories of standing that might
apply.270 My point is simply to show that sovereign preemption state
standing does not apply and, in so doing, to demonstrate the limits of the
doctrine.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have introduced and explicated the doctrine of
sovereign preemption state standing. First, the state must allege that the
Executive Branch has underenforced the federal law in a way that is
inconsistent with a governing statute. Second, the state must be able to
269 200 U.S. 496, 518 (1906) (describing a lawsuit between states as “a situation which, if it arose
between independent sovereignties, might lead to war”). In effect, the Constitution removes a state’s
prerogative to go to war with another state but creates for it the opportunity to sue the other state in
court.
270 Of note in this regard is the Court’s suggestion in Massachusetts v. EPA that states effectively
surrender their power to invade sister states in order to address transboundary issues. That may indeed
in some sense obligate the Executive Branch to apply federal law so as to minimize transboundary
effects. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. Alternatively, Congress might create a statutory
cause of action to cover interstate spillovers from marijuana legalization. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (2012)
(Clean Air Act provision empowering states and subdivisions thereof to petition EPA for relief to the
extent that a stationary source or a group of stationary sources in another state allegedly emits regulated
pollutants to a degree that the emissions contribute significantly to the petitioning entity’s failure to
comply with federal air quality standards).
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point to preemption of state law; in particular, either the preemption of state
law must be obvious and clear from a federal statute or the federal
government must have previously sought, or be concurrently seeking, to
preempt state law. In addition, there must be a nexus between area of
preemption and the area in which the Executive Branch is allegedly
underenforcing federal law.
Sovereign preemption state standing rests on a functional
understanding of the injury a state suffers when the federal government
precludes it from regulating in an area and then the Executive Branch
provides underenforcement of the governing federal statutory law. The
doctrine squares well with precedent and makes sense of some precedent
that has to this point flummoxed lower courts and commentators. Sovereign
preemption state standing complements other settings where states have
standing to sue the federal government. Finally, the doctrine can be
overlaid with various prudential standing doctrines, which further would
narrow the scope of the doctrine.
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